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TOWARDS A WORLD RULE OF LAW--
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
AMERICAN COURTS
ALAN SCHECHTER*
A sn-ajor factor in the development of a world rule of law is the alttffide
of municipal courts toward questions possibly involving intcmational cus-
tomary law. Mr. Schechter reviews the practice of American fcdcral and
state courts since the end of World War 11, concentrating on the types of
evidence considered to establish the existence of customary rules.
The most challenging issue facing mankind today is the survival of
liberty and free institutions in a world torn between two opposing ideol-
ogies. Advances in nuclear technology have made the traditional concept
of the employment of force to insure survival nearly obsolete. Further,
the democratic states of the world hopefully recognize that the use of
both military and nonmilitary coercion to halt the spread of totalitarian
ideas leads only to derogation of the very liberties which the free world
desires to preserve.
President Eisenhower presented the nation with his thoughts on the
problem of survival in a bipolarized world in his annual State of the Un-
ion address before Congress midway through his second term of office.
The President said:
All peoples are sorely tired of the fear, destruction, and the waste of war. As never
before, the world knows the human and material cost of war and seeks to replace
force with a genuine rule of law among nations.
It is my purpose to intensify efforts during the coming 2 years in seeking ways to
supplement the procedures of the United Nations ... to the end that the rule of law.,
may replace the rule of force in the affairs of nations.1
The President's nationwide emphasis on the need for a rule of law
in international relations follows upon the increased concern of the orga-
nized bar with the possibilities for peace inherent in a world-wide rule
of law. Speeches, resolutions and committee reports by members of
the bar have been unanimous in their support of the rule of law in inter-
national affairs.2
* Fulbright Scholar, International Court of Justice at The Hague.
1. 105 Cong. Rec. 358, 362 (1959).
2. See, e.g., a resolution passed by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Akccda-
tion supporting the action of the United States delegation to the United Nations for main-
tenance of the rule of la.. Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 43 A.B.A.J. 332, 375
(1957). See also Dewey, A Sacred Goal: Peace Under Law, 44 A.B.AJ. 1047 (1953);
Parker, We Must Go Forward: Law in the Vorld Community, 44 A.B3Aj. 641 (1953);
Rhyne, World Peace Through Law: The President's Annual Address, 44 A.B.AJ. 937
(195S).
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Professional journals have printed articles tracing the relationship
of the law of nations to American municipal law, to the application
of international law by municipal courts, and to the limitations on judi-
cial recourse to international law, but no systematic attempt has been
made to analyze the adoption and development of international law in
the process of decision-making.3 This article attempts to study the ap-
proach of United States courts, both state and federal, to problems of
international law in the post-World War II period.
Although a survey of all the relevant cases would be impossible within
the limitations of this article, an effort has been made to include all the
important cases and a representative sampling of the less valuable de-
cisions. Only as a secondary matter has an attempt been made to report
the content of the decisions as international law developments. The
main concern is with the process of decision-making itself, for the pur-
pose of increasing our knowledge of why and how municipal courts ar-
rive at certain conclusions on issues involving the law of nations. Such
knowledge may well provide a firm base for an understanding of what
the future course of international law may be in state and federal courts.
Further, an increase in understanding of the development of international
law in municipal courts cannot help but hasten the growth of a world
rule of law in international relations.
Although international conventions are a major source of law, treaties
between states can serve only as the underpinnings of a world society
based on law. Multilateral and bilateral treaties are not and should not
be binding on nonsignatory states. At the same time, conventions are
strong evidence of common agreement among nations, agreement which
serves to transfer a rule of conventional law into the realm of customary
law. As a result of the common usage of nations, rules of customary law
are binding on all states.4 Since progress toward a world society based
on law depends on the acceptance by states of binding legal principles,
this article focuses on the problems of customary law development.
The cases fall into three broad categories: (1) decisions not based on
international law, (2) decisions based on a common law approach to
3. For an excellent series of articles see Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the
National Law of the United States (pts. 1-2), 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 26, 792 (1952-1953); Dick-
inson, The Law of Nations as National Law: "Political Questions," 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 451
(1956).
4. See Stat. Int'l Ct. Just. art. 38, which provides: "(1) The Court, whose function is to
decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. . . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."
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customary law, and (3) decisions which focus directly on customary
international law questions.
In following the noninternational law approach, the courts avoid de-
ciding cases on a customary law basis. Instead, grounds for decision-
making are found in policy, equity, statutory law, State Department
rulings, or the Constitution. Under the common law approach, the
courts merely accept the rule of law as binding, without discussion of
the rule itself or the basis for its existence. The generally accepted prin-
ciple may be justified either as a rule of customary law or of American
law. United States cases are occasionally cited to show that the rule is
a generally accepted principle of law.
The final broad category, the international law approach, is of major
importance. Here the courts attempt to find customary law rules, basing
their decisions on the existence or nonexistence of such rules. Analysis
of what types of evidence are persuasive and of what the courts look for
in deciding upon the existence of a rule of customary law has required
division of this category into numerous subgroups: (a) unratified inter-
national conventions, (b) ratified international conventions, (c) foreign
court decisions as evidence of state practice, (d) international law pub-
licists, (e) executive department statements and legislation, (f) diplo-
matic communications, (g) failure to protest, (h) generally accepted
principles, and (i) history.
In conclusion, preliminary answers are presented to the questions
raised by the analysis of the various approaches employed by courts
in the decision-making process. An effort will be made to discover why
the courts prefer one approach to another, in what areas of law the
various approaches are favored, what evidence of the existence of a
customary law rule is most persuasive to a court, whether the state and
federal courts differ in their outlook toward issues of customary inter-
national law, and, finally, what the American courts can do to speed the
development of a world society based on law.
I. NONCONSmERATION OF CUSTomARY LAW IssuEs
A. Policy and Equity
The use of considerations of policy and equity as a ground for decision-
making is revealed in a series of cases involving the immunity of a foreign
sovereign plaintiff from counterclaims. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in Na-
tional City Bank v. Repnblic of China,i stated the general rule that
immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit had been established solely
through adjudications of the Supreme Court and was not based on an
explicit command of the federal constitution. "It rests on considerations
5. 343 U.S. 356 (1955).
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of policy given legal sanction by this Court."' Whether a foreign sover-
eign possesses immunity from suit because of the establishment of a
binding rule of customary law by the general usage of nations, as an
alternative line of reasoning to policy considerations, is not discussed in
this opinion.
Equitable considerations have led to two exceptions to the immunity
rule. When a foreign sovereign enters United States courts in pursuit of
a claim, the court has jurisdiction to entertain a counterclaim seeking
an adjudication of title to the precise property which is the subject of
the action, 7 or one in the nature of a setoff which arises from the same
transaction upon which the sovereign plaintiff bases its claim.8
National City Bank v. Republic of China9 presents an example of
the extension of a rule of law based on considerations of justice and
morality. The Court went beyond the rule of related counterclaims and
focused on the continuing business relationship between the parties,
holding that a foreign sovereign which had brought suit was not im-
mune from a counterclaim limited to reducing the sovereign's recovery,
even though the counterclaim was not based on the subject matter of the
suit and did not grow out of the same transaction. The Court stated
that the doctrine of immunity was "one of implied consent by the ter-
ritorial sovereign to exempt the foreign sovereign from its 'exclusive and
absolute' jurisdiction, the implication deriving from standards of public
morality, fair dealing, reciprocal self-interest, and respect for the 'power
and dignity' of the foreign sovereign."'" The key to Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's thinking lies in his statement that "the ultimate thrust of the
consideration of fair'dealing which allows a setoff or counterclaim based
on the same subject matter reaches the present situation."'" As in the
6. Id. at 359.
7. Republic of Haiti v. Plesch, 190 Misc. 407, 73 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (In-
clusion of property other than subject matter of action negatives exception).
8. Hungarian People's Republic v. Civil Associates, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.N.Y.
1953) (setoff does not give rise to affirmative relief); United States v. New York Trust
Co., 75 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (counterclaim did not arise from same transaction).
9. In a suit by the Republic of China to recover a deposit, defendant interposed two
counterclaims seeking affirmative relief on defaulted treasury notes of plaintiff. Following
a plea of sovereign immunity, the district court dismissed the counterclaims. 108 F. Supp.
766 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The court of appeals, affirming, held the plaintiff immune from coun-
terclaims, whether treated as requests for affirmative relief or as setoffs, since they were
not based on the subject matter of the suit. 208 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1953). On certiorari,
defendant dropped its demand for affirmative relief and reduced the counterclaims to mere
demands for setoff. In a four-to-three decision, the Supreme Court directed the district
court to reinstate the counterclaims. 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
10. 348 U.S. at 362.
11. Id. at 365. Mr. Justice Frankfurter found it worth noting that the State Depart-
ment had not been asked nor had it given the slightest indication that allowance of counter-
claims involving fiscal management would embarrass friendly relations with China. Id. at
[Vol. 29
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case of the basic question of sovereign immunity itself, no attempt is
made to discover whether any rule or rules of customary law exist which
would throw light on the further issue of exceptions to the general rule
of immunity.
Considerations of both policy and equity appear dominant in several
cases involving the power of a belligerent occupant to make regulations
for occupied territory. In Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United States,12
the Court of Claims ruled that the occupying powers were not liable for
the cost of what Japan had done to rehabilitate herself, despite the fact
that the claim arose directly from an order of the occupying authority.
The extent of the belligerent occupant's right in international law to
make and enforce laws was not even raised. The decisive point was
that the order was issued for the benefit of the Japanese and only in-
cidentally for the benefit of the occupation forces. As a result, the basis
of the court's judgment seems to be a sub rosa feeling that admission of
United States liability would constitute enrichment of Japan at the ex-
pense of the occupying government.
No mention is made of the right of the occupant to make currency
regulations in Eisner v. United States. 3 The Court of Claims found a
satisfactory explanation for the alleged conversion of plaintiff's bank
account by order of the American Military Commander of Berlin in
an assessment of the difficulty of the task of occupation. In effect, the
court ruled that the commander must have had the power to establish a
rational money system because, "until a stable currency was established,
economic recovery lagged, the population suffered, and the financial bur-
den upon the occupying powers continued. 1 14 The policy of the allied
governments, plus the fact that "the currency reform.., was... rea-
sonably calculated to accomplish a beneficial purpose,"'0 was sufficient
authority for denying plaintiff's claim.
364. Further, the opinion cited the exception to the sovereign immunity rule ba-zd on
related counterclaims as evidence that fair play must be taken into account. Ibid. Mr.
Justice Reed, dissenting, argued that the decision violated the common usage of nations
and that the change from a generous to a parsimonious application of the sovereign im-
munity rule should be left to the political branches of the government. 34S U.S. at 366-72.
12. 130 Ct. CL 361, 127 F. Supp. 553, cert. denied, 349 US. 933 (1955). The ca:e aroae
from an order of the Supreme Commander of the occupying forces directing the Japaneze
to use a vessel which they had seized during the war to lay and repair marine cables. The
court did not discuss the right of an occupation commander in international law to order
the conquered territory to keep the vessel. Instead, it found authority for the order in the
surrender terms and in a letter from President Truman to General MacArthur stating that
the General's authority was supreme. Id. at 367 n.1, 127 F. Supp. 557 n.1, citing letter from
President of United States to General MacArthur, Sept. 6, 1945.
13. 127 Ct. CL 323, 117 F. Supp. 197 (1954).
14. Id. at 326, 117 F. Supp. at 199.
15. Id. at 327, 117 F. Supp. at 199. The court also was influenced by the fact that the claims
1960]
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Policy decisions have been important in two other areas of law in
the postwar period. Extraterritorial effect has been denied nationaliza-
tion decrees of foreign governments for property located in the United
States on two similar but not identical grounds. The courts have held
either that no national policy existed requiring the court to give extra-
territorial effect to the confiscation, 6 or that the confiscation was con-
trary to public policy and therefore, the court must deny extraterritorial
effect to the foreign decree.1
7
In the leading post-World War II case18 on the subject of treaty sus-
pension or abrogation in wartime, the Supreme Court premised that the
outbreak of war did not necessarily suspend or abrogate the provision of
a 1923 treaty with Germany granting reciprocal rights to sell inherited
realty and export the proceeds.'9 The Court stated that its function was
to determine whether the treaty provision was inconsistent with the policy
or safety of the nation and, hence, presumably intended to be limited to
peacetime. Thus, abrogation would occur only if the Executive or Con-
gress had formulated a policy clearly inconsistent with enforcement or
if the treaty provision itself was incompatible with a state of war."
arose from a prewar deposit in a bank which was made hopelessly insolvent by the collapse
of the German Government. The court considered the reform order not a conversion of
957o of plaintiff's amount, but a grant of 5% of funds which no longer existed. Ibid.
16. Zwack v. Kraus Bros., 135 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Authority for this view Is
found in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 221-25 (1942), and Anderson v. N.V. Trans-
andine Handelmaatschappij, 28 N.Y.S.2d 547 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 263 App. Div. 705, 31
N.Y.S.2d 194 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942).
17. Plesch v. Banque Nationale, 273 App. Div. 224, 77 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1st Dep't), aff'd
per curiam, 298 N.Y. 573, 81 N.E.2d 106 (1948); Augstein v. Banska A Hutni Akclova
Spolecnost, 124 N.Y.S.2d 446 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Merilaid & Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 189
Misc. 285, 71 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1947). In the Augstein case, supra, the court cited
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 977-b(19), which denies extraterritorial effect to foreign confiscatory
laws affecting foreign corporate property in the state, and Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York
Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1934), for the holding that arbitrary confiscation
is contrary to public policy. Although both grounds for decision focus on public policy and
not on the customary law issue, it is worthwhile keeping them separate. Perhaps the courts
in these cases should have looked to the relevant conflict of law rules of the forum before
deciding the cases on public policy grounds.
18. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508 (1947).
19. Treaty of Friendship, Commercial and Consular Rights With Germany, Dec. 8, 1923,
art. IV, 44 Stat. 2132, T.S. No. 725.
20. 331 U.S. at 508-14. The Court found that the right of inheritance of realty was not
inconsistent with the provision prohibiting the removal of money or property from this
country by enemy aliens in the Trading With the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411 (1917), as
amended, 55 Stat. 839 (1941), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-40 (1958), nor with the
Treaty of Peace With Germany, Aug. 25, 1921, 42 Stat. 1939, T.S. No. 658, which accorded
the United States all rights and advantages specified in the Joint Resolution of July 2,
1921, 42 Stat. 105, 106, vesting in the United States absolute title to property of German
nationals then held by the United States. In addition, no evidence appeared that the
[Vol. 29
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B. Statutes
Recent cases which have been decided on statutory grounds involve
questions of diplomatic immunities and suspension of the statute of limi-
tations in wartime. In Carrera v. Carrera,' registration with the De-
partment of State in accordance with the United States Code" and in-
clusion on the "List of Employees in the Embassies and Legations in
Washington not Printed in the Diplomatic List" was held dispositive of
the issue of immunity in a suit for separate maintenance and custody and
support of a child. The court, feeling bound by the statutory grant ofimmunity, held that certification by the Department of State as to the
inclusion of the defendant's name on the "White List" made judicial
inquiry into the propriety of its listing inappropriate.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in Hale, v. Statei3 indicated by way
of dictum that the failure of the Swedish Ambassador to notify the De-
partment of State of appellant's employment as personal servant to the
air attach6 of the embassy in accordance with the Code precluded a grant
of diplomatic immunity in a criminal prosecution. A statutory grant of
immunity included in a joint resolution of Congress -4 authorizing the
President to bring into effect the United Nations Headquarters Agree-
ment15 was held decisive of the issue of immunity in Fricdburg v. Santa
Cruz.2 6
In Westchester County v. Ranoo,27 the City Court of New Rochelle ap-
plied the International Organizations Immunities Act,2s concluding that
an issue of fact had to be tried to decide whether defendant was engaged
in official business as required by the act. A federal district court applied
the International Organizations Immunities Act and the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement in United States v. Coplon 9 and concluded that
political departments of the Government considered the collapEQ and surrender of Germany
as putting an end to such provisions of the treaty as survived the outbra: of the war or
to the obligation of either party in respect to them.
21. 174 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
22. Rev. Stat. §§ 4065-66 (1375), 22 U.S.C. § 254 (1953).
23. 200 Md. 72, S3 A.2d 312 (1952).
24. Joint Resolution of Aug. 4, 1947, 61 Stat. 762.
25. Agreement With the United Nations Respecting the Headquarter, of the United
Nations, June 26, 1947, art. V, § 15, 61 Stat. 3427, TIJ.A . No. 1676 (effective Nov. 21,
1947).
26. 274 App. Div. 1072, S6 N.Y.S.2d 369 (2d Dep't) (pcr curiam), motion for leave to
appeal denied, 275 App. Div. 710, 37 N.Y.S.2d 427 (2d Dep't 1949). See ako Arcaya v.
Paez, 145 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 244 F.2d 95S (2d Cir. 1957). Sea
Tsiang v. Tsiang, 194 Misc. 259, 36 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct. 1949); People v. Van Otter, 202
Mlise. 901, 114 N.Y.S.2d 295 (New Rochelle City CL 1952).
27. 137 Misc. 777, 67 N.Y.S.2d 31 (New Rochelle City CL 194).
28. Section 7, 59 Stat. 671 (1945), 22 U.S.C. § 23;Sdb) (1958).
29. S4 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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the defendant was not entitled to immunity. In Emmet v. Lomakin, °
the court ruled that a consul was not immune from a writ of habeas
corpus under United States statutory law. In none of these cases did
the courts reach the question of what immunities the defendant possessed
in international law.
Few cases deal with the subject of suspension of the statute of limita-
tions on statutory grounds. De Sayre v. De La Valdene 1 is perhaps the
clearest example of this type of decision. A resident of France during
the period of German occupation was held to be a nonresident enemy
alien as defined by the Trading with the Enemy Act,32 which prohibits
the commencement of actions by enemy aliens. The court was bound
by a New York statute33 suspending the running of the statute of limita-
tions in the event of a statutory prohibition to the commencement of the
action.34
In an early stage of the now famous Bernstein case,"0 the plaintiff
argued that his claim was preserved by a 1948 amendment to Section
13 of the New York Civil Practice Act, which tolled the statute in cases
where the cause of action arose in a foreign country with which the
United States was then or subsequently at war."0 The district court,
applying New York law, held that the amendment applied only to claims
arising in favor of nonresidents, whereas plaintiff had been a resident of
the state since 1933.
C. State Department Rulings
It would be of little value to go through all the diplomatic immunity
cases of the postwar period, looking for statements that municipal courts
30. 84 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
31. 124 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd mem., 283 App. Div. 918, 130 N.Y.S.2d 865
(1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 307 N.Y. 861, 122 N.E.2d 747 (1954).
32. 40 Stat. 411 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-40 (1958).
33. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 24.
34. Compare Frabutt v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 84 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Pa. 1949),
where the court held it a firm rule of international law that existence of a state of war
between two nations suspends the running of the statute of limitations between citizens
of such countries. It was only fair and just that the operation of the statute be suspended,
ruled the court, since the courts are necessarily closed to belligerent citizens during war.
Here, the international law rule was stated and justified on grounds of fairness and justice,
but no explanation was given for the source of the rule in international law. Compare also
Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1947), where the statute was tolled for
an American held prisoner by the Japanese from 1941-1945. The district court's dismissal,
74 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), was overruled by the court of appeals, with the statement
that the considerations for tolling the statute were present. It would be the "height of
unreasonableness," said the court, to give an enemy alien a right not possessed by an Amer-
ican held prisoner during the war. 164 F.2d at 769.
35. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 79 F.
Supp. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), modified, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949).
36. Id. at 40-41.
[Vol. 29320
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hold a Department of State determination on the subject of immunity
controlling. In nearly all of the cases cited under subdivision (B), a sec-
ond major justification for the holding was a State Department com-
munication that defendant had immunity. In Tsiang v. Tsiang,3-T for
example, the unqualified representation by the Department of State that
defendant had immunity was held in and of itself to prevent further
examination of the question. But the defendant's immunity arose both
from the representation and from a statute.
Cvrranz v. City of New York3S followed the strict rule that a State
Department determination precludes the court's independent considera-
tion of the immunity question. Considering the fact of diplomatic status
to be a political question and a matter of state, the court concluded that
raising such issues in court could only serve to embarrass the United
States in the conduct of foreign relations. Thus, in contrast to English
and French practice, the United States courts feel bound not only by
executive determinations of diplomatic status, but also by State Depart-
ment rulings as to the immunity arising from such status. As a result,
the courts successfully avoid consideration of the problems of diplomatic
immunity in customary international law.
State Department rulings also have been held conclusive in cases in-
volving recognition of states, 9 capacity of an enemy alien government
to sue after surrender but before the declaration of peace,", sovereignty
of a foreign country following United States conquest and military con-
trol, 1 and sovereign immunity from suit.12
D. United States Constitution
Consideration of international law questions has often been neglected
when important constitutional issues have been raised. Arguments have
been advanced repeatedly that the United Nations Charter prpvisions
dealing with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 3 are
the supreme law of the land under the treaty clause of the Constitution
and must be followed by the courts under the international law principle
pacta sunt servanda. Attempts to invoke the Charter have been particu-
37. 194 Misc. 259, 86 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
3S. 191 Misc. 229, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 1947), afi'd mer., 275 App. Div. 734, S3
N.Y .S.2d 924 (2d Dep't 1949).
39. Klausner v. Levy, S3 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Va. 1949); Latvian State Cargo & Pas-
senger S.S. Line v. Clark, S0 F. Supp. 63 (D.D.C. 194S), aff'd, 13 F2d INO (D.C. Cir.
1951).
40. Japanese Gov't v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 101 F. Supp. 243 (S.DN.Y. 1951).
41. Bruneil v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
42. New York & Cuba Alail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korca, 132 F. Supp. 6S4 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Netherlands East Indies Gov't, 75 F. Supp. 4S (S.DN.Y. 1947).
43. U.N. Charter arts. 1, 2, 55.
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larly prevalent in cases involving discriminatory alien land laws and
restrictive covenants based on racial prejudice. Of the alien land law
cases, only Sei Fujii v. State44 involved a court decision based on the
Charter.
The concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Black,
in Oyama v. California,45 involving the constitutionality of the California
Alien Land Law,4" are particularly notable for their reference to the
Charter provisions on human rights and fundamental freedoms. The
two Justices agreed that the land law was a barrier to the United States
pledge in the Charter and that the law's inconsistency with the Charter,
which had been duly ratified and adopted by the United States, was but
one more reason why the statute must be condemned.47
The restrictive covenant cases follow the same general pattern as the
land law cases. In holding racial restrictive covenants unenforceable on
the ground that such enforcement would constitute state action contrary
to the fourteenth amendment, the courts have not raised pertinent ques-
tions of customary and conventional law.48
44. 97 Adv. Cal. App. 154, 217 P.2d 481 (2d Dist. 1950), aff'd on other grounds, 38 Cal.
2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). The district court of appeals held the discriminatory legislation
unenforceable under the Charter and decided that the fact that Japan was not a member
did not render its nationals ineligible for guarantees extended under the Charter. On appeal,
the California Supreme Court found that the law violated the fourteenth amendment. The
court relied on Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.), for the view
that the treaty did not supersede state law because it was not self-executing. "[The provi-
sions] state general purposes and objectives of the United Nations Organization and do
not purport to impose legal obligations on the individual member nations or to create rights
in private persons." 38 Cal. 2d at 722, 242 P.2d at 620-21. Further, the provisions were held
by the court to "lack . . . mandatory quality and definiteness which would indicate an
intent to create justiciable rights . . . ." Id. at 724, 242 P.2d at 622.
45. 332 U.S. 633, 649-50, 673-74 (1948).
46. Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 261 (Deering 1944) (Supp. 1945).
47. See Mamba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949), in which the Oregon
Land Law, Ore. Laws 1945, ch. 436, was held unconstitutional. The court relied on
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), and Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334
U.S. 410 (1948), a decision based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The court referred to the signature of the Charter to show that the United States
was bound by the principles expressed therein. See State v. Oakland, 129 Mont. 347, 287
P.2d 39 (1955), where the Montana Alien Land Law, Mont. Laws 1947, ch. 44, was
invalidated on the basis of Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952), and
Mamba v. McCourt, supra. Again, the case was decided on fourteenth amendment grounds,
but the court cited, with approval, the reasons given by Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr.
Justice Black in their concurring opinions in Oyama v. California, supra.
48. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Only in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1948), in a dictum, does the Court mention the treaty obligations of the United States.
The Court ruled that the Civil Rights Act, Rev. Stat. § 1978 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1958), guaranteeing to all citizens equal property rights, was controlling in the District of
Columbia and prohibited the judicial enforcement of discriminatory covenants. But the
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Cases on the issue of the legality of seizure and confiscation of enemy
alien property in wartime have focused on the Constitution and not on
the international law issue. In Silesian-American Corp. v. Clart4 9 and
Clark v. Uebersee Fizanz Korporation,o the Supreme Court did not dis-
cuss whether this exception to the doctrine of no confiscation without
compensation was justified in customary law.51 The Court appeared
satisfied with the statement that the United States had the right to vest
enemy property under the war powers of Congress.
II. THE Co=oN LAW APPROACH
The second major approach to decision-making by United States courts
on questions involving issues of customary international law is based on
what the courts consider generally accepted rules of either international
or municipal law. In contrast to cases discussed in the first section of
this article, decisions following this approach to law development do not
obscure the international law questions presented in the cases. However,
although this category of decision-making does not avoid customary law
problems, neither does it clarify them. Little or no effort is made to dis-
cuss the basis of the rule, to evaluate its foundations in international
law, or to analyze foreign state and court practice. The rule is merely
included in the particular decision, occasionally with a qualifying remark
that the rule was derived from international law. The court then con-
cludes that the rule is decisive of the factual situation in question.
Analysis of the many cases following this approach would add little
to this article. To facilitate comparisons between the three major ap-
proaches, between the development of law in state and federal courts,
and between various areas of international law, however, a cursory study
of some representative cases might be useful. A common law approach
was particularly notable in post-World War II cases dealing with (1) the
abrogation or suspension of treaties as a result of war, (2) suspension
of the statute of limitations in wartime, (3) the right of a consular officer
to appear in court to represent his nationals, and (4) the nonadjudication
of the validity of foreign decrees affecting property within the borders
of the foreign country. The principles in areas (2) and (3) are generally
accepted rules of international law; the principle in area (1) is treated
primarily as a rule of international law, although this is not expressly
Court went further in saying that, even in the absence of the statute, cnforccmcnt of the
covenants would be contrary to public policy as manifestcd, among other places, in trcatic3.
Id. at 35.
49. 332 U.S. 469 (1947).
50. 332 U.S. 4-0 (1947).
51. Compare Jessup, Enemy Property, 49 Am. J. Int'l L. 57 (1955), vith De Vrics, The
International Responsibility of the United States for Vested German Ascets, 51 Am, J. Int'l
L. iS (1957).
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stated in the cases; the principle in area (4), although it states a rule
of international law, is treated as an accepted rule of municipal law.
The courts have not handled cases involving treaty abrogation or
suspension uniformly. Clark v. Allen52 seems to have been decided pri-
marily on the fact that no national policy existed inconsistent with en-
forcement of the treaty provisions in question. The case is also cited
as authority for the view that whether or not a treaty provision remains
in force during wartime depends on the intrinsic nature of the treaty pro-
vision itself. Subsequent cases have attempted to focus on this latter
doctrine in determining the effect of war on treaties between belligerents.
In re Meyer's Estate3 applied this standard to the provision of a treaty
of 1827 with Bremen dealing with inheritance of property. 4 The Cali-
fornia court concluded that the provision was not abrogated, since there
was nothing incompatible between its enforcement and existence of a
state of war.55 Meier v. Schmidt56 presents an example of confusion be-
tween a treaty suspended or abrogated by policy and one suspended or
abrogated because of internal inconsistency with a state of war.57
In Brownell v. City & County of San Francisco,5 8 the issue of treaty
52. 331 U.S. 503 (1947); see text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
53. 107 Cal. App. 2d 799, 238 P.2d 597 (2d Dist. 1951).
54. Convention of Friendship, -Commerce and Navigation With the Free Hanseatic Re-
publics, Dec. 20, 1827, art. VII, 8 Stat. 370, T.S. No. 157.
55. Accord, Ex parte Arakawa, 79 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Here the court held
that the entire Treaty of Commerce and Navigation With Japan, Feb. 21, 1911, 37 Stat.
1504, T.S. No. 558, was suspended because to carry out its terms would have been In-
compatible with a state of war. The only provision before the court was to the effect that
citizens of the respective nations should enjoy the same privileges as those granted to
natives. However, the court did not consider the issue of separability of the treaty pro-
visions.
56. 150 Neb. 383, 34 N.W.2d 400 (1958).
57. The court evidently wanted to follow the "inconsistency with state of war" doctrine
in determining the effect of war on the provisions of a 1923 treaty with Germany giving
nationals of either state free access to the courts of justice of the other state. Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights With Germany, Dec. 8, 1923, art. I, 44 Stat.
2133, T.S. No. 658. To do so, however, the court cited the Trading With the Enemy Act
§ 7(b), 40 Stat. 416 (1917), 50 U.S.C. App. § 7(b) (1958), as evidence of a congressional
policy to prevent the lending of aid and comfort to the enemy. The court then held that
the statutory prohibition showed that the treaty provisions were incompatible with the
maintenance of a state of war.
An alternative basis for the decision could have been the rule of customary law that courts
of belligerent states are dosed to citizens of the opponent country. See In re Yamashita,
327 U.S. 1 (1946); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). This line of reasoning could have
led the court to the conclusion that the treaty provisions were incompatible with a state of
war without the confusion that arose from the court's interpretation of the Trading With
the Enemy Act as evidence of national policy.
58. 126 Cal. App. 2d 102, 271 P.2d 974 (1st Dist. 1954). The Attorney General,
as successor to the Alien Property Custodian, sued to recover taxes paid under protest
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suspension or abrogation was decided on the common law ground, and
policy was cited to reinforce the "intrinsic character" doctrine. The court
held that a tax exemption was not so incompatible with a state of war as
to require the inference that the contracting parties intended suspension
or abrogation of such exemption during the war. Tax exemption of Ger-
man consular property could not impair the war effort. After construing
the intrinsic nature of the treaty provision, the court took judicial notice
of a communication from the State Department to the Department of
Justice, stating that the legal effect of the provision was unchanged by
war."" The court also spoke of the possibility of retaliation by foreign
governments if the treaty were held abrogated. Unlike Clar: v. Allen,"
in which the Supreme Court ruled that its function was to determine
whether the treaty provision was inconsistent with the policy or safety
of the nation, the court here did not cite policy as an independent basisfor its holding, but only as evidence in applying the "intrinsic character"
of the treaty provision. Consideration of the nature of the exemption
itself and of the expression of State Department policy led the court to
the conclusion that the tax exemption was not incompatible with the
existence of a state of war.
In none of these cases involving treaty abrogation in wartime did the
courts analyze the rule itself. A court infrequently may have taken the
preliminary step of inquiring into what was the rule of law to be applied,
but rarely has one delved into the basis for the doctrine and its foundation
in international law. Never has a rule's application by foreign states
been considered. In effect, the courts have merely applied the doctrine
and closed their eyes to pertinent questions of customary law.
Mlost cases of suspension of a statute of limitations in wartime have
on real property owned by Germany from 1941-1947. The Treaty of Friend-ip, Com-
merce and Consular Rights With Germany, Iec. 8, 1)23, art. X." , 44 Stat. 2149, T.S.
No. 658, had exempted such property from taxation. The district court of appAL held
that the exemption was neither suspended nor abrogated by the declaration of ar under
the Trading With the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1-40
(195s).
59. The communication provided in part: "This Government has consistently en-
deavored to extend to the property of other governments situated in territory under the
jurisdiction of the United States of America the recognition normally accorded such prop-
erty under international practice and to observe faithfully any rights guaranteed such prop-
erty by treaty.... In view of these considerations, the Department of State perceive no
objection to the position which the Office of Alien Property is advancing that the pro%isions
.. remain in effect despite the outbreak of war between the United States and Germany."
Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, for Acting Secretary of State, to Tom C.
Clark, Attorney General, Nov. 10, 194S, in 126 Cal. App. 2d 107-3, 271 P2d at 977-73.
60. 331 U.S. 503 (1947); see text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
1960]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
followed the same attitude toward law development." Peters v. McKay 2
asserts frequently the existence of a rule of international law that the
statute of limitations is tolled in wartime between citizens of belligerent
states. Aside from repetition to the point of monotony, its only authority
for the rule appears to be three Civil War cases 3 and a series of cases
based on these early decisions. Frabutt v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R."4
also held it a firm rule of international law that existence of a state of
war served to suspend the statute. Here a federal district court stated
that the rule of international law was not expressly stated in the statutes,
but was applied by the courts by reading the rule into the statutes. This
court went so far as to say that the rule of law was fair and just, but
seemed wholly oblivious to the importance of explaining its source, its
foundation in international law, and its application by foreign states.
In both cases, the courts satisfied themselves by stating the rule and
then applying it to the facts in question.
In a series of cases involving the right of a consul in international
law to represent his nationals in foreign courts, in the absence of statu-
tory or treaty stipulations granting such a right, the courts again have
merely stated the rule and held it decisive.0 5
A final area of law where the courts employ a rule as an accepted
principle of law without further justification is the "act of state" doc-
trine. Bernstein v. Van Heygken Freres Societe Anonyme 0 is par-
ticularly descriptive of this approach. Judge Learned Hand, speaking
for the Second Circuit, framed the question as whether the determina-
tion of the validity of Nazi acts in Germany in 1937 was within the
jurisdiction of a New York court. Holding that United States courts
will not pass on the validity of the acts of a foreign sovereign in its own
territory, Judge Hand said: "We have repeatedly declared, for over a
period of at least thirty years, that a court of the forum will not under-
take to pass upon the validity under the municipal law of another state
of the acts of officials of that state, purporting to act as such."07
61. For exceptions see cases cited in notes 26-35 supra.
62. 195 Ore. 412, 238 P.2d 225 (1951).
63. Id. at 428-31, 238 P.2d at 232-33, citing Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177
(1872); Hanger v. Abbot, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532 (1867); Metropolitan Nat'l Bank v. Gordon,
28 Ark. 115 (1872).
64. 84 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
65. In re Arbulich's Estate, 248 P.2d 179 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952), rev'd on other
grounds, 41 Cal. 2d 86, 257 P.2d 433, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953); Zolezzi v. Taran-
tola, 138 N.J. Eq. 579, 49 A.2d 482 (Ch. 1946); In the Matter of Bedo, 207 Misc. 35, 136
N.Y.S.2d 407 (Surr. Ct. 1955).
66. 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). Sec also Pasos v. Pan
American Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Bloch v. Basler Lebens-Versicherungs-
Gesellschaft in Basel, 73 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
67. 163 F.2d at 249. Judge Hand did not perceive in executive policy any indication that
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Judge Hand completely ignored the question of customary interna-
tional law, basing the generally accepted principle solely on municipal
court decisions. Whether an exception existed to the general rule was
held solely a question of executive policy, not of international law or
foreign practice.
III. CUSTo M AY LAW D~cIsIoNs
United States courts find evidence of customary international law in
diverse ways. Courts often cite international conventions, both ratified
and unratified, foreign court decisions as evidence of state practice,
writers, executive department statements, legislation, diplomatic com-
munications, failure to protest, generally accepted principles, and his-
tory. Rarely are they satisfied with reference to only one or two of
these evidences of international custom. In most cases, the courts cite
as many proofs of custom as are applicable to the particular factual
situation. Rather than study each case separately, as an independent
attempt to discover whether a rule of customary law exists, this section
will investigate the various types of evidence cited. Obviously, this
method of analysis must involve frequent cross references to cases
and different types of evidence.
A. Unratified International Conventions
Four cases citing unratified conventions as evidence of a general
consensus of thought accepted by nearly all nations have been reported
in the last fifteen years. In Bergman v. Dc Sieycs,c' the French Minister
to Bolivia was sued in a civil action while in New York en route to his
post. The district courfa found that the authorities were divided on the
question of the immunity of a diplomat while in transit but it neverthe-
less granted diplomatic immunity, basing its decision on two pre-1S90
New York cases," an 1840 French decision,7 the Harvard Research
in International Law,' a communication of the Secretary of Statey
and the Pan American Convention on Diplomatic Officers." The dis-
the doctrine should not apply in the case of German hostilitics. Id. at 251. Howcver, Judgqe
Clark, dissenting, found such a policy. Id. at 253, 255. State Department Recare No. 295,
April 27, 1949, cited in Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amcrihaansche Stoomvaart-Maat-
Schappij, 210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam), indicates Judge Clark xvas corrccL
68. 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 194).
69. 71 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
70. Wilson v. Blanco, 4 N.Y. Supp. 714 (Super. Ct. 18S9); Holbrook v. Hcnder-on, 6
N.Y. Super. Ct. 619 (1839).
71. Beyley v. Piedanna et Mauroy, Trib. civ. Seine, 1S40, [1841] Sircy Recuell G -nral
Ir. 14S (Fr.).
72. Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, 26 Am. J. Int'l L. Spcc. Supp. 8S-$3 (1932).
73. Letter From Secretary of State Root to Secretary of Commerce and Labor Strauz,
March 16, 1906, in 4 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 513 (1942).
74. Convention on Diplomatic Officers, Feb. 20, 1923; scee text in Harvard Rezearch in
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trict court declared: "This Convention has been ratified by several of
the States . . . but ... not . . . by the United States. So far as the
United States is concerned, it, of course, lacks the force of law, but it is
important as being the first formal pronouncement . . .of the Law of
Nations in this regard.1
7 5
Speaking for the Second Circuit, Judge Learned Hand found the
Pan American Convention strong authority on the issue of immunity.
For the first time in the history of the case, Judge Hand cited the state-
ment in the preamble of the convention that the agreeing states had
decided to "conclude a convention incorporating the principles generally
accepted by all nations.17 , Judge Hand said that the convention made
no distinction between diplomats in transitu and in situ, "and it does
this in a convention which professes to incorporate 'the principles ac-
cepted by all nations.' Thus it constitutes weighty authority: i.e., the
consensus of opinion of the distinguished lawyers there assembled as
to what 'principles' on the subject were at that time 'generally accepted'
as part of international law."' 77 But Judge Hand evidently did not
think it necessary to state that only a few Latin American countries
had ratified the convention. No connection is made between the failure
of most of the signatory states, including the United States, to ratify the
convention and the validity of the preamble's statement that the princi-
ples included in the convention were declaratory of already existing
customary law. It could have been argued that the failure of many
states to ratify the convention was strong evidence that state practice did
not support the words of the preamble.
A somewhat similar case, involving a convention ratified by the
United States but not by the country in which defendant was incorpor-
ated, was presented in Glenn v. Compania Cubana de Aviacion.5 At
issue was the defendant's claim to the benefits of exemptions from and
limitations to liability of the Warsaw Convention of 1929 even though
Cuba was not a high contracting party. The convention provided for
its application to all international transportation by aircraft for hire."9
The convention defined international transport by the character and na-
ture of the transport, and not by reference to the citizenship of passen-
gers and carriers. The court concluded that the convention was designed
to provide an international code declaring the rights and liabilities of
International Law, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, 26 Am. J. Int'l L. Spec. Supp.
175 (1932).
75. 71 F. Supp. at 341.
76. 26 Am. J. Int'l L. Spec. Supp. 175 (1932).
77. 170 F.2d at 362.
78. 102 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. Fla. 1952).
79. Convention With Other Powers Relating to International Air Transportation, Oct.
12, 1929, ch. 1, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3014, T.S. No. 876 (effective with reservation Oct. 29, 1934).
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parties to international carriage by air and was to be applied by the
courts of the countries adopting it. Therefore, the convention applied,
regardless of the Cuban incorporation of the defendant carrier. The
convention constituted binding customary law."0
The court did not think it necessary to inquire into the general
acceptance of the convention, but it is worth noting just how many
states had ratified this convention held to constitute a binding rule of
law. Of thirty contracting parties in 1944, only two, Brazil and Mexico,
were Latin American nations.-1 By 1960, the number of ratifications had
grown to fifty-one, but only Argentina and Venezuela had joined the
Latin American signatories5 2 Twenty-six of the fifty-one member
nations are on the European continent. Certainly it would not be easy
to conclude from these statistics that the convention is expressive of a
generally accepted rule of law binding on all nations. P As in Bergman
v. De Sieyes,4 the court required little in the way of proof of the exist-
ence of a general consensus accepted by nearly all nations. The evi-
dence of a rule of custom was insufficient, inadequate for the desired
purpose, and imperfectly examined by the court, but the court seemed
to have no difficulty in arriving at a clear-cut decision.
The Second Circuit showed equal facility for reading a consensus of
thought sufficient to establish a generally accepted rule of law into an
unratified convention and superseded conventions in Lambros Seaplane
Base, Inc. v. The Batory.15 The case turned on the novel question of
whether a seaplane was a vessel subject to salvage within general mari-
time law. judge Hincks, looking first to state practice, found the only
relevant case to be an English holding that a seaplane was not subject to
salvage under maritime law.s  That case was severely criticized and
80. The court was certainly injudicious in speaking of the convention as contituting a
binding rule of customary law and in the same breath stating that it was to be applicd by
the courts of the various countries adopting it. If the rule were one of gcncrally accepted
customary law, it was binding on the courts of all states, not just those which had formally
bound themselves by the convention. Otherwise, states that have not ratified gain the rights
included in the convention without being required to accpt the duties that accompany
such rights in international law.
81. U.S. Dep't of State, Pub. No. 2103, Treaties in Force 126-27 (1944).
82. U.S. Dep't of State, Pub. No. 6959, Treaties in Force 201-02 (19G0).
83. In contrast to this view, Shawcross & Beaumont, Air Law 1 41 ({d cd. 1951), Etate
that the general principles of the convention are "well on their way to universal ac-
ceptance" since there is no competing system and the convention has received adherence
in both hemispheres. But the authors suggest that difficulties in the application of the con-
vention may result from the creation of many new states since 1939.
84. 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948).
85. 215 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1954).
86. Watson v. R. C. A. Victor Co., S0 Lloyd's List L.R. 77, 1935 Am. Mar. Cas. 1291
(Sheriff's Ct. 1934).
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promptly overruled by the Air Navigation Act of 1936,87 which ex-
pressly extended the law of salvage to aircraft at sea. In 1936, Ireland
adopted similar legislation.88
Since a generally accepted rule of law could hardly be found on the
basis of Irish and English practice, the court looked to municipal cases
and statutes. The United States cases held only that a seaplane was not
a vessel within limitation of liability statutes" or within the purview of
a criminal statute.90 The statutes offered only a weak peg on which to
hang the decision. The 1951 amendment to the Air Commerce Act of
192691 was regarded as an express recognition by Congress that it was
necessary to assimilate the regulation of seaplanes into the navigation
laws. Although the statute did not deal at all with the question of
marine salvage of airplanes, the court ruled that it constituted a cogent
suggestion that the courts should similarly assimilate seaplanes into
the maritime law of salvage. 92
To bolster the decision, the court cited the Pan American Conven-
tion on Commercial Aviation of 1928, which stated that salvage of
aircraft at sea shall be regulated by the principles of maritime law.U
Also referred to were similar provisions in the Paris Air Navigation
Convention of 191914 and the 1938 Brussels Convention on Salvage of
Aircraft at Sea.95 From these conventions, and the view of textwriters,
the court concluded: "Although no international convention appears to
control our decision here, we think it well worth noting that there is this
highly reputable consensus of thought expressed by those participating
in the development of international law. . . .,"' On these considerations,
87. 26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8, c. 44. The court incorrectly cited the Air Navigation Act
of 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 80.
88. Shawcross & Beaumont, op. cit. supra note 83, f" 113.
89. Noakes v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., 29 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Dollins v.
Pan-American Grace Airways, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
90. United States v. Peoples, 50 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
91. Act of Oct. 11, 1951, ch. 495, § 3, 65 Stat. 407, amending 44 Stat. 572 (1926) (now
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 1109(a), 72 Stat. 799, 49 U.S.C. § 1509(a) (1958)).
92. 215 F.2d at 233. A contrary argument could just as easily be made from these facts.
The court might have ruled that Congress' express assimilation of regulation of seaplanes
into the navigation laws, accompanied by a failure to mention the question of salvage,
indicated an intention opposed to the assimilation of seaplanes into general maritime law.
93. Pan American Convention on Commercial Aviation, Feb. 20, 1928, art. XXVI, 47
Stat. 1907, T.S. No. 840.
94. Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11
L.N.T.S. 173-310.
95. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Assistance and Salvage
of Aircraft or by Aircraft at Sea, September, 1938, in Shawcross & Beaumont, op. cit. supra
note 83, f1f1 1173-90.
96. 215 F.2d at 233.
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the court ruled that a seaplane was subject to the maritime law of
salvage.
What Judge Hincks failed to state in concluding that a highly reputa-
ble consensus of thought existed was that none of the conventions were
in force in the United States at the time of the action. More than half
of the thirty-eight states that ratified the Paris Convention were Euro-
peany7 Although the United States did not ratify the Paris Convention,
it was one of sixteen states to ratify the Pan American Convention.
These two conventions were expressly superseded by the Chicago Con-
vention on International Civil Aviation of 1944.11 The provision that
aircraft at sea shall be regulated by principles of maritime law, how-
ever, was omitted from the superseding convention.
The only convention dealing specifically with the question before the
court, the Brussels Convention on Salvage of Aircraft at Sea, was signed
by sixteen states, but had not been ratified by any state as of July
1950." Although from the facts cited by judge Hincks, the conclusion
that a "highly reputable consensus" existed was reasonable, it would
be difficult to argue that a generally accepted rule of law also existed.
The facts omitted from the opinion indicate that the consensus could
hardly be used to justify the existence of a rule of customary law. State
practice, as shown by the failure of states to ratify the Brussels Con-
vention and the omission of the salvage provision from the Chicago Con-
vention, did not indicate positive international acceptance of the view-
point adopted by the court.
The final case of an unratified convention held to constitute a binding
rule of law is Mz2rarka v. Bachrack Bros."'  On the subsidiary ques-
tion of whether proof of plaintiff's citizenship in India was adequate
for jurisdictional purposes, the court ruled: "It is the undoubted right
of each country to determine who are its nationals, and it seems to
be general international usage that such a determination will usually
be accepted by other nations."'" For this view, the court cited the
Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws,1"' signed at The Hague
in 1930. In the ten years following the opening of the convention to
accession only twelve states had deposited ratifications. 1 3 The con-
97. Shawcross & Beaumont, op. cit. supra note 83, M4.
93. Convention With Other Powers Respecting International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7,
1944, ch. xrII, art. S0, 61 Stat. 1203, T.I.A.S. No. 1591.
99. Shawcross & Beaumont, op. cit supra note S3, fl 45.
100. 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954).
101. Id. at 553.
102. Protocol With Other Powers Relating to Military Obligations in Ccrtain Cafa of
Double Nationality, April 12, 1930, arts. 1, 2, 50 Stat. 1319, T.S. No. 913.
103. League of Nations Off. J., Spec. Supp. No. 191-95 at 72-73 (1946).
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vention was certainly a weak ground for finding a generally accepted
rule of law.
B. Ratified International Conventions
International conventions have played an important part in several
postwar cases on the rights and duties of a belligerent occupant over
conquered territory. In In re Yamashita,11 4 the Supreme Court was
confronted with the question of whether a commanding officer had a
duty to control his subordinates in occupied territory. On the inter-
national law question, Chief Justice Stone held (1) that the charge
sufficiently stated that acts directed against civilians in clear violation
of the law of war as expressed in the Hague Conventions were com-
mitted by an armed force under petitioner's command, and (2) that
the law of war imposed on him a duty to take appropriate measures to
control the troops under his command.
The Court found the rule of law in Article 1 of the Regulations of
the Fourth Hague Convention on Laws and Customs of Land Warfare,'"'
which held that an armed force must be commanded by a person re-
sponsible for his subordinates in order to be accorded the rights of lawful
belligerents; article 43 of the same Regulations, declaring that a com-
mander must attempt to restore public order and safety; 00 Article 19
of the Tenth Hague Convention on Bombardment of Naval Vessels le0
and Article 26 of the Geneva Red Cross Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field,0 8
both of which held that a commander must see that the articles of the
convention are carried out. Chief Justice Stone concluded that these
provisions plainly imposed a duty on petitioner to take such measures
as were within his power to protect civilians and prisoners of war.
In contrast to the majority opinion that these conventions expressed
a binding rule of law, Mr. Justice Murphy argued that the charge did
not state a recognized violation of the laws of war. He found effective
control of his troops, which the petitioner was convicted for failing to
achieve, an impossibility under the circumstances, due to the complete
disorder of the Philippines at the time of the atrocities in 1944-1945.
International law, he ruled, made no attempt to define the duties of an
104. 327 U.S. 1 (1946). This was a habeas corpus suit for lack of jurisdiction to try the
prisoner by a military court. Mr. Chief Justice Stone ruled that a military trial was au-
thorized by 1) the political branch of the Government, 2) military command, 3) interna-
tional law and usage, and 4) the surrender terms of the Japanese Government.
105. Convention With Other Powers Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, art. 1, para. 1, 36 Stat. 2295, T.S. No. 539.
106. 36 Stat. 2306.
107. Convention With Other Powers for the Adoption to Maritime Warfare of the Prin-
ciples of the Geneva Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2389, T.S. No. 543.
108. July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2092, T.S. No. 847.
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army commander under constant and overwhelming assault, nor did it
impose responsibility for the failure to meet the ordinary responsibili-
ties of command. The dissenting Justice stated that the Court's reliance
on vague and indefinite references in the Hague Conventions and the
Geneva Red Cross Convention was misplaced,' and he cited instead
the laws of war recognized by the United States to show that a defeated
commander was not responsible for the excesses of disorganized troops.
The Basic Field Manual Rules of Land Warfare, for instance, showed
that the United States recognized individual criminal responsibility
for violations of the laws of war only as to those who commit the
offenses or who order or direct their commission.11 He concluded that
in no recorded instance had the inability to control troops under attack
by superior forces been made the basis for a charge of violating the
laws of war.
Mr. justice Rutledge dissented on the ground, among others, that
petitioner's trial was not in accord with Articles 60 and 63 of the Geneva
Convention on Prisoners of War."' Japan had not ratified the conven-
tion, but at the beginning of the war both the United States and Japan
announced their intention to adhere to its provisions. Mr. Justice
Rutledge found in the legislative history of the convention an intention
by the drafters not to foreclose a future holding that under the terms
of the convention a state was bound to apply the provision to prisoners
of war of nonparticipating states. "And not to foreclose such a holding
is to invite one."" 2 He continued:
Moreover, if this view is wrong and the Geneva Convention is not strictly binding
upon the United States as a treaty, it is strong evidence of and should be held binding
as representing what have become the civilized rules of international warfare. Yama-
109. To prove that the Court's reliance was misplaced, Mr. Justice Murphy citcd dif-
ferent interpretations of the phrases by international law authiritics. Laute-rpact rtatcd
responsibility means responsibility to some higher authority. 2 Oppenhcim, International
Law 204 n.3 (6th ed. Lauterpacht rev. 1940). Wheaton hd. the same and added that pos-
sibly it merely means one who controls his subordinates. Wheatcin, International Law 172
n,30 (7th ed. Keith 1944). Westlake stated responsibility vas nuthing more than a capacity
for exercising effective control. 2 Westlake, International Law 61 (ISO7). Edmond- and
Oppenheim stated that responsibility means holding a position of authority. Edmonds &
Oppenheim, Land Warfare 19 (1912). 'Mr. Justice Murphy thought it was dcar that the
provisions of the Fourth Hague Convention did not imply that the commander of the
defeated army would be held to a high standard of efficiency when he was under deAructive
attack, nor did it imply criminal responsibility for war crimes committed by his troops in
such circumstances. He declared that none of the other conventions were relevant to the
factual situation here. 327 U.S. at 36-37.
110. U.S. War Dep't, Pub. FI 27-10 [ 347 (1940).
111. Convention With Other Powers Relating to Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, arts.
60, 63, 47 Stat. 2051, 2052, T.S. No. S46.
112. 327 U.S. at 73 n.36.
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shita is as much entitled to the benefit of such rules as to the benefit of a binding
treaty which codifies them." 3
One receives the impression from reading In re Yamashita that the
majority did not consider it necessary to look far to find the existence
of a rule of customary law. Mr. Justice Murphy's destruction of the
majority's "plainly imposed" duty is the best existing evidence that the
Court wanted to find a generally accepted international law rule as one
of the reasons for denying the writ of habeas corpus. In the light of the
attitude of authorities on inte'rnational law toward the cited convention
provisions, the majority's holding that the provisions were evidence of a
rule of law is certainly questionable.
Aboitiz & Co. v. Price"4 also involved the power of a belligerent
occupant over conquered territory under international law. The court
ruled that Article 43 and Section 3, entitled "Military Authority over the
Territory of the Occupied State," of the Regulations of the Fourth
Hague Convention" 5 were expressive of the body of rights and duties
incumbent on the occupant which had been developed by international
customary law.
Both the United States and Japan signed and ratified this international agreement,
which declares the governing international law principle: that the commander of a
force occupying enemy territory "shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country."" 68
The court did not determine the scope of the authority permitted
an occupant in international law. Rather, it addressed itself to two
specific questions: (1) Should a municipal court recognize Japanese
army pass money as a valid medium of exchange? (2) Should a United
States court, long after the war is won, recognize as valid the Japanese
army edict forbidding traffic in that money under penalty of death
between internees and friends outside the camp? The court applied
the general test sanctioned by customary law, i.e., were the decrees
limited to the necessity of preserving the peace, order and good
government of the Philippines? Tested by this principle, the fiat cur-
rency was valid. Some recognized medium of exchange was necessary
113. Ibid. The Court did not decide whether the convention was binding on the United
States. Instead, the majority ruled that articles 60 and 63 were not properly invoked by
the petitioner and that by their terms they were not applicable to the proceeding. Mr.
Justice Rutledge disagreed with this argument. 327 U.S. at 20-24.
114. 99 F. Supp. 602 (D. Utah 1951). This was an action on a promissory note given
to secure repayment of money advanced by plaintiff to defendant during the period when
defendant was a prisoner of the Japanese.
115. Convention With Other Powers Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, arts. 42-56, 36 Stat. 2306, T.S. No. 539.
116. 99 F. Supp. at 610.
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to keep the economic life of the community going. However, the act
prohibiting traffic in money did not benefit and protect the inhabitants
and provide protection against derangement of economic life. The
court held it invalid because it was directed against the United States,
obnoxious to our ideas, and intended primarily to aid Japan's efforts
to defeat the United States.
Unlike In re Yamashita, the ruling here was clear-cut. Looking for
a rule of law, the court found an express statement of the applicable
principle in a convention to which both belligerents were parties. As a
result, the court had no difficulty in applying the general principles to
the particular factual issues.
In the Matter of Mzdler"7 involved the same question of the right
of an occupant to make laws in conquered territory. The United
States had prescribed certain foreign exchange laws prohibiting un-
licensed transactions involving foreign exchange in occupied Europe.
Authorities on international law were cited for the view that, while the
United States was not sovereign over occupied territory, it had supreme
authority under customary law. The court also cited an English
case decided in 1722,118 stating that where the King conquered a
country he acquired a right and property in the people and could
impose any laws he pleased. Relying on these sources, the court ruled
that the United States had the right to impose the foreign exchange laws
on occupied territory.
The process of analyzing factors of customary law is totally inadequate
in this case, in contrast to Aboitiz & Co. v. Price. I" After stating that
the occupying nation did not acquire sovereignty, but rather an undefined
"supreme authority," the court cited the eighteenth century English
case holding that the belligerent occupant did acquire sovereignty.
The customary law relied upon was substantially modified by the
Hague Conventions, but no mention was made of these international
regulations. No question was raised as to the extent and character of
the occupant's customary law right to prescribe laws. Instead, the
decision implied that the vague "supreme authority" gave the United
States the power to make any laws binding upon the inhabitants of
the occupied territory, regardless of the provisions of the Fourth Hague
Convention. Articles 42-56 of the Hague Regulations are directly op-
posed to the English case on which the court placed such great weight.
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations played an important part in a
dictum of the Second Circuit in State of the Netherlands v. Federal
Reserve Bank,'2" which involved a decree promulgated by the Nether-
117. 199 Misc. 745, 104 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
1s. Anonymous, 2 P. Wins. 75, 24 Eng. Rep. 646 (Ch. 1722).
119. 99 F. Supp. 602 (D. Utah 1951); see text accompanying notes 114-16 supra.
120. 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953), reversing 99 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). PIaintif
1960]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
lands Government-in-exile. Judge Charles Clark, considering the ques-
tion of an absent sovereign's power to make regulations for occupied
territory, held that the nineteenth century American view denying
effect to such regulations' 2 ' had been modified by the Hague Conven-
tion. The pre-occupation laws of the sovereign outside the legitimate
scope of the occupant's control remained in force under article 43 122
The question of new legislation by the absent sovereign was not quite
as certain, since the Hague Regulations did not deal explicitly with
the problem. The court then cited European court decisions giving
effect to the enactments of the legitimate sovereign applying to the
occupied territory2 3 and the publicist McNair for the view that,
"assuming the new law to fall within the category of that large portion
of national law which persists during the occupation, it ought to operate
in occupied territory." 2 4
Judge Clark concluded that the decree might have been hostile, but
that it was not opposed to the legitimate authority of the occupant
since Article 46 of the Hague Regulations prohibited confiscation of
private property by the occupant. 25  "We may add," he said, "that
the conclusion to which we find ourselves impelled by current doctrines
sued to recover four bonds seized by the Germans in the Netherlands, sold on the Paris
black market to a Swiss firm and resold to a United States citizen not a holder in due
course. The Netherlands Government-in-exile had promulgated a decree vesting protective
title in the Netherlands to all securities belonging to natural or legal persons domiciled In
the Netherlands. The district court ruled that the absent sovereign had no right in cus-
tomary law to legislate for the occupied territory. The court of appeals reversed, holding
the decision in Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 28 N.Y.S.2d 547
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 263 App. Div. 705, 31 N.Y.S.2d 194 (lst Dep't 1941), aff'd, 289
N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942), controlling. In that case, the court had found that rights
based upon Dutch law to intangible property having its situs in New York are recognized
and enforced by the courts of this state unless such enforcement would offend the public
policy of the state. In the present case, Cities Service v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330 (1952), was
cited for the view that the actual location of bonds does not determine their situs for all
purposes. The court then determined that the situs of the debt was not at the locus of the
certificate since in the case of looting of securities the domicile of the corporate debtor was
a much more significant point of contact than the location of the certificate. Having disposed
of the case on the grounds that the bonds were in the United States for the purpose of the
suit, the court went on to consider the effect of the decree in international law.
121. E.g., Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 612 (1850); United States v. Rice,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246, 254 (1819).
122. "The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of tho
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far
as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws
in force in the country." Convention With Other Powers Respecting the Laws and Customs
of Wars on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2306, T.S. No. 539.
123. 201 F.2d at 462.
124. McNair, Municipal Effects of Belligerent Occupation, 57 L.Q. Rev. 33, 73 (1941),
quoted in 201 F.2d at 462.
125. 36 Stat. 2307.
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of international law seems to us more necessary and appropriate to the
world to which we have come than the mid-nineteenth century view
followed below.' 126
Here the court was not impressed by the heavy weight of contrary
evidence. The fact that the United States had consistently held as a
matter of law that decrees of absent sovereigns for territory under
occupation by American military forces were a nullity was not even
mentioned. The closing remark of the court, placing stress on the
importance of the requirements of the period, adds strength to the
argument that the court thought that a rule of customary law should
exist. As a counterpart, the remark cannot but detract from the decision
that a rule of customary law already existed. This dictum, then, is an
example of the actual development of a customary law rule by the
municipal courts.
Several cases in the postwar period have interpreted the Shipowner's
Liability Convention of 1936.127 The leading case on the question of
maintenance and cure for an injured seaman is Farrell v. United
States.S The 1936 draft convention of the International Labor
Organization, which became effective in the United States in 1939,
required that a shipowner defray the expense of medical care and
maintenance until the sailor was cured or until the sickness or incapacity
had been declared permanent.'5 The Supreme Court noted: "While
enactment of this general rule by Congress would seem controlling, it
is not amiss to point out that the limitation thus imposed was in
accordance with the understanding of those familiar with the laws of
the sea and sympathetic with the seaman's problems."'30° American
admiralty courts, the Court said, adhered to the doctrine of maintenance
and cure prior to the adoption of the convention, despite occasional
ambiguity of language.''
The rule of customary law accepted by the majority in Farrell v.
United States was contested by Justices Douglas, Black, Murphy and
Rutledge, dissenting, 3" After citing an 1S32 decision"3 to the effect
that the shipowner remained liable until the cure was completed, the
126. 201 F.2d at 463.
127. Convention With Other Members of the International Labor 0r-anizatign Rcz -:ct-
ing Shipowners' Liability in Case of Sickness, Injury, or Death of Scamn, Oct. 24,
1936, 54 Stat. 1693, T.S. No. 951.
128. 336 U.S. 511 (1949).
129. Art. 4, para. 1, 54 Stat. 1696.
130. 336 U.S. at 517.
131. Id. at 51S, citing The Point Fermin, 70 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1934) ; Skolar v. L!Ih
Valley R.R., 60 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1932); The Bouker No. 2, 241 Fed. S31 (2d Cir. 1917);
The Wensleydale, 41 Fed. 829 (D.C.N.Y. 1S90).
132. 336 U.S. at 521.
133. Reed v. Canfield, 20 Fed. Cas. 426 (No. 11641) (C.C.D. Mass. 1332).
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dissent, noting the provision in article 12 of the convention that nothing
in the convention shall affect any law or custom which insures more
favorable conditions than those therein provided," 4 ruled that the
convention was not declarative of customary law binding the Court
since American maritime decisions provided greater benefits than
allowed by the convention. In a case of extreme hardship, the Court
could easily have gone beyond the formula expressed in the convention.
Perhaps plaintiff's negligence and absence from his ship helped lead the
Court to accept the statement in the convention as a binding rule of law.
Smith v. United States'35 presented the question of the shipowner's
liability for maintenance and cure for any injury occurring to a sailor
while on personal business ashore. The Fourth Circuit held the Ship-
owner's Liability Convention, providing that liability shall exist between
the time of reporting for duty and termination of service,' declarative
of customary international law. The language of the convention, the
court ruled, manifestly covered shore leave not in the ship's service.
In Warren v. United States,"37 the Supreme Court discussed the con-
vention's purpose-"to equalize operating costs by raising the standard
of member nations to the American level"3 8-and concluded that it
provided a reasonable average for international application in a suit
for maintenance and cure. It again held that the convention constituted
customary international law binding upon the Court.
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions and the opinions
of textwriters were insufficient to create a generally accepted rule of
customary law in Karadzole v. Artukovic."'1 In an earlier part of the
case,140 the court of appeals had decided that an extradition treaty of
1902 with Serbia14 ' was still in effect with Yugoslavia in 1954. The
remaining question was whether the particular crime charged was
extraditable. The Yugoslav indictment charged appellee with respon-
sibility for the deaths of 250,000 persons while he was Minister of the
Interior under the Nazi occupation. The appellee argued that he was
not subject to extradition because of the treaty provision prohibiting
surrender of fugitives charged with political offenses. 42 Appellant
claimed that war crimes were extraditable offenses within the meaning
134. 54 Stat. 1700.
135. 167 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 1948).
136. Art. 2, para. 1, 54 Stat. 1695.
137. 340 U.S. 523 (1951).
138. Id. at 527.
139. 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957).
140. Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818 (1954).
141. Treaty With Servia for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, Oct. 25,
1901, 32 Stat. 1890, T.S. No. 406 (effective May 17, 1902).
142. Art. VI, 32 Stat. 1892.
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of international agreements to which the United States was a party.
The court was forced to examine the concept of political offense in cus-
tomary law and to determine whether any applicable customary law
rule existed.
It was argued that by virtue of General Assembly Resolutions of
1946 and 1947 on the surrender of alleged war criminals4 3 the court
must hold the offense extraditable. The court replied: "We have
examined the various United Nations Resolutions and their background
and have concluded that they have not sufficient force of law to modify
long standing judicial interpretations of similar treaty provisions."""
The court also noted an argument by Professor Quincy Wright that
"codification of offenses against the law of nations should be developed
to indicate those offenses with a political aspect which should be excluded
from the concept of 'political offense' and made subject to extradition
to the country where the offense was committed ... ."I'l Other writers
on international law also held the view that war crimes were beyond
political acts and the extradition of the offender was the only justifiable
course of action." 6 The court, however, rejected this argument as to
the existence of a rule of law allowing extradition of war criminals
despite treaty provisions excluding offenses of a political character.147
The court here passed over the question of whether a unanimous
resolution by the General Assembly constituted general agreement
among nations sufficient to establish a rule of law. The statement that
the resolutions did not have sufficient force of law to modify treaty
provisions indicated that the court was thinking in terms of the legal
effect of agreements to which the United States was a contracting party,
and not in terms of customary law.
United States v. Coplon' also raises the question of just what
constitutes a rule of customary law. Unmentioned by the court, but
in the background of the case, is the General Convention on Privileges
and Immunities of United Nations Personnel, " ' which gives subordinate
143. U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 2d Sess., Plen. 471 (.425) (1947); U.N. Gen. A_3.. Off.
Rec. 1st Sess., Plen. 664 (A/50) (1946).
144. 247 F.2d at 205.
145. Wright, Book Review, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 202, 20 (1956), quoted in 247 F.2d at
205.
146. E.g., Garcia-Alora, International Law and Asylum as a Human Right 91-102
(1956), cited in 247 F.2d at 204.
147. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a hearing.
Karadzole v. Artukovic, 355 U.S. 393 (195S). On hearing, surrender of the defendant was
denied. United States v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 333 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
143. 88 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (Ryan, J.) (motion to dismis the indictment
denied).
149. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946,
1 U.N.T.S. 15; see text in 43 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 1 (1943). In an earlier dispzrition of
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United Nations officials diplomatic immunity. The Headquarters
Agreement,'5 0 on the other hand, gives representatives of member
states other than those in the capacity of head representatives or am-
bassadors immunity only for official acts. At the time of the Coplon
case, thirty-seven states had ratified the convention; the United States
had not then and has not today. The court did not consider the question
of whether a binding rule of customary law existed. Sixty-three states
have now ratified the convention.' 5 ' In a future immunities suit, the
argument may well be made that the convention is binding on the
United States not as a treaty, but as express customary law. Certainly,
accession by a majority of states is stronger evidence of generally ac-
cepted principles than the convention ratified by only a handful of
states held binding in Bergman v. De Sieyes.'52 But the courts would
not be receptive to such an argument. Unlike the status of the French
minister in the Bergman case, the immunities of United Nations repre-
sentatives and officials are covered expressly by federal statute. The
statute conflicts with the convention, but no court is likely to decide
the issue on the basis of international law and thereby flout the supreme
law of the land.
C. Foreign Court Decisions as Evidence of State Practice
United States courts often cite decisions of foreign courts in attempt-
ing to show the existence of a rule of law. In Bergman v. De Sieyes,15
the Second Circuit cited a French decision 54 to prove that a diplomat
in transit has immunity. The district court in Glenn v. Compania de
Aviacion 5 mentioned an English case" 6 which held that the Warsaw
the case, the court, sua sponte, had undertaken to examine the question of its jurisdiction
to try the defendant Valentine A. Gubitschev, a Soviet citizen and employee of the United
Nations, for conspiracy to violate the espionage laws. In that disposition, an order was
entered stating that the court had jurisdiction; but, unlike the later opinion, the General
Convention was mentioned by the court. 84 F. Supp. 472, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (Rifkind,
J.).
150. Agreement With the United Nations Respecting the Headquarters of the United
Nations, June 26, 1947, art. V, § 15, 61 Stat. 3427, T.I.A.S. No. 1676.
151. U.N. Legal Dep't, Status of Multilateral Conventions, at 111-3 (ST/LEG/3, Rev.
1) (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 52.V.6) (1959, Rep. No. 9, 1960).
152. 71 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948); see text ac-
companying notes 68-76 supra.
153. 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948).
154. Beyley v. Piedanna et Mauroy, Trib. civ. Seine, 1840, [1841] Sirey Recuell G6n6ral
II. 148 (Fr.).
155. 102 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. Fla. 1952) ; see text accompanying notes 78-83 supra.
156. Grein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., [1937] 1 K.B. 50 (CA.). See also In the Matter
of Muller, 199 Misc. 745, 750, 104 N.Y.S.2d 133, 137 (Surr. Ct. 1951), citing Anonymous,
2 P. Wins. 75, 24 Eng. Rep. 646 (Ch. 1722) ; see text accompanying notes 117-18 supra.
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Convention was designed to provide an international code declaring
the rights and liabilities of parties to international carriage contracts
by air regardless of the citizenship of the parties.
In Aboitiz & Co. v. Price,57 to support the view that fiat currency
decrees were valid in international law, the court cited Haw Pia v. Chine
Banking Co.' and subsequent Philippine decisions approving the cur-
rency in question. In State of the Netherlands v. Federal Rescve Banh,'
the district court and the court of appeals drew opposite conclusions from
their consideration of foreign cases. The district court, on the authority
of a Greek decision of 1930,1c" held that the view prior to World War II
considered acts of de jure governments as having no force and effect
in occupied territory. The court of appeals cited postwar decisions
of courts in Holland, Norway and Belgium,"0' a Polish decision of
19 271 C and a Belgian decision of 19 19,irs and concluded that the Greek
case was the only contrary holding. Several English cases are cited in
United States v. Coplon'I to show that the English courts recognize
as a general principle of law that diplomatic privileges and immunities
are conferred only upon persons sent by one state to another on diplo-
matic missions.
The statutory grant of diplomatic immunity in Arcaya v. Paez'c5
dealt only with the first half of the question before the district court.
The statutory immunity prohibited service of process'c" but did not tell
157. 99 F. Supp. 602 (D. Utah 1951); see text accompanying notes 114-16 cupra.
153. S0 Philippine 604 (1948), cited in 99 F. Supp. at 607 & n.3.
159. 99 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), rev'd, 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953).
160. Occupation of Cavalla, Court of Thrace, 41 Thmis 417, 1930, [1929-19301 Ann.
Dig. 496 (No. 292) (Greece).
161. Re Hoogeveen et al., Cour de Cassation, Nov. 6, 1944, [1945] Pasicrife belg, I. 33,
[1943-1945] Ann. Dig. 432 (No. 143) (Bel.); Agrocide v. Arzodd, Court of Appeal, The
Hague, Nov 18, 1946, [1943] N.J. No. 9S, [1946] Ann. Dig. 349 (No. 142)%Ncth.); Public
Prosecutor v. Reidar Haaland, Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Aug. 9, 1945, [1945]
Norsk Retstidende 13, [1943-1945] Ann. Dig. 444 (No. 194)(Nor.).
162. Stasiuk i Jagnycz v. Klewec, Sad Najwyzzzy, May 11, 1927, I O.S.P. No. 422,
[1927-192S] Ann. Dig. 560 (No. 3S0) (Pol. Sup. CL).
163. De Nimaal v. De Nimal, Cour d'Appel de Brudles, April 23, 1919, [1919] Pasicriele
beige II. 83, [1919-1922] Ann. Dig. 447 (No. 311) (Be.).
164. SS F. Supp. 915, 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), citing Widmore v. Alvarcz, cited in Evans
v. Higgs, 2 Stra. 797, 93 Eng. Rep. S54 (KB. 1731); Crosse v. Talbot, S Mod. Rep. 2M, C3
Eng. Rep. 205 (K.B. 1724).
165. 145 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1957). Dzfcndant
in a libel suit moved for summary judgment on grounds of immunity by virtue of his
status as Consul General of Venezuela at the time of scrvice of procczs and from hias ap-
pointment after that time as permanent representative to the United Nations.
166. Agreement With the United Nations Respccting the Headquarters of the United
Nations, June 26, 1947, art. V, § 15, 61 Stat. 3427, T.LJAS. No. 1676 (permanent rcpre-
sentatives accorded same immunities as ambassadors accredited to the Unitcd Statc3); IS
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the court what to do where process had been served and the court
had acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit before
diplomatic immunity had been acquired. To determine its duties in
this situation, the court looked to an English case'0 7 which had found
the rule of law in Grotius' Laws of War and Peace that the immunity
of an ambassador was not limited to service of process, but included
protection from the necessity of defending a suit. The district court
concluded: "No one has suggested that any court has ever held other-
wise or suggested any good reason why a court should do so."'"
A final case citing foreign court decisions is American Transatlantic
Co. v. United States,'69 which held it a rule of international law that
a seizing nation could show in prize court that a ship flying a neutral
flag was actually owned by an enemy, while a ship flying an enemy
flag could not show in court that its owner was neutral. The basis for
this rule was found in several British decisions, 170 no American cases
being in point. But the judicial practice of one maritime power is a
relatively weak basis for a conclusion that a rule of customary law exists.
It appears fairly obvious from the decision in this case and in Arcaya
v. Paez that the courts in both cases focused their attention on foreign
court practice only because they could not find stronger evidence of
generally accepted rules of law.
D. International Law Publicists
It is common practice for courts to review the views of writers on
international law questions in determining the existence of a rule of
customary law. In Bergman v. De Sieyes,'7 ' the court found the
authorities divided and looked elsewhere for the rule. Mr. Justice
Murphy, dissenting in In re Yamashita, 72 cited the differing views of
legal authorities on the meaning of several phrases in certain Hague
regulations to prove that the interpretation of the majority was incor-
rect. Four treatise writers were named for the view that Article 43 of
the Fourth Hague Convention constituted a binding rule of law in
Aboitiz & Co. v. Price.'71 In In the Matter of Muller, 74 the Surrogate
U.S.C. § 1251 (1958) (Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction of suits against ambas-
sadors).
167. Magdalena Steam Nay. Co. v. Martin, 2 El. & El. 94, 121 Eng. Rep. 36 (Q.B. 1859).
168. 145 F. Supp. at 472.
169. 113 Ct. Cl. 484, 83 F. Supp. 832 (1949).
170. The Proton, [19181 A.C. 578 (P.C.); The St. Tudno, [1916] P. 291; The Fortuna,
1 Dods. 81, 165 Eng. Rep. 1240 (High Ct. of Adm. 1811).
171. 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948) ; see text accompanying notes 68-77 supra.
172. 327 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1946) ; see note 109 supra.
173. 99 F. Supp. 602, 610-11 (D. Utah 1951).
174. 199 Misc. 745, 749, 104 N.Y.S.2d 133, 137 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
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cited Oppenheim, Hall, Higgins and Mloore for the theory that the
United States, while not sovereign over occupied territory, had "supreme
authority" and the right to enforce exchange regulations under such
authority. Judge Clark referred to McNair in State of the Netherlands
v. Federal Reserve Bank,7 5 and Briggs was mentioned as one support
for the decision as to proof of nationality in Mvrarka v. Bachirack
Bros.7' A book review by Quincy Wright was cited by the Ninth Circuit
in Karadzole v. Artzkovic.177
In it re Territo,17S an American citizen captured while fighting with
the Italian army in 1943 was held to be a prisoner of war within the
provisions of the Geneva Convention'" on the basis of the law of war
and agreement of treatise writers'"0 that all persons active in opposing
an army in war, regardless of citizenship, may be captured and held
as prisoners of war. The court also quoted a Supreme Court statement
that United States citizenship "of an enemy belligerent does not relieve
him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because
in violation of the law of war."'' The court did not explain why
fighting for Italy constituted a breach of the law of war.
Citations to legal authorities have been prominent in several postwar
cases dealing with problems of treaty interpretation. For the view that
treaties are binding upon a successor state which is created by a division
of territory, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in Hanafin v. Mc-
Carthy,"'0 looked to the writings of Mloore and Crandall.1S  On the
basis of these authorities, the court held that until the new state
exercised its sovereign right to enter into new treaties, the treaties by
which it was bound as part of the whole state remained binding.
The validity between the United States and Yugoslavia in 1954 of a
175. 201 F.2d 455, 462 (2d Cir. 1953), citing McNair, 'Municipal Effects of Bclli1rent
Occupation, 57 L.Q. Rev. 33, 73 (1946).
176. 215 F.2d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1954), citing Briggs, The Law of Nations 45G-CO (2d
ed. 1952).
177. 247 F.2d 193, 204 (9th Cir. 1957), citing Wright, Book RCview, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev.
202 (1956).
178. 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946).
179. Convention With Other Powers Relating to Prisoners of War, July 270, 1929, 47
Stat. 2021, T.S. No. S46.
ISO. 156 F.2d at 145, citing Hall, International Law., § 131 Sth ed. 1924); 2 Opp:nbeim,
International Law 300 (6th ed. Lauterpacht rev. 1940); 2 Winthrop, Military Law, and
Precedents 122S (2d ed. 1920).
181. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-33 (1942), quoted in 156 F-2d at 145.
182. 95 N.H. 36, 57 A.2d 14S (194S).
183. Id. at 38-39, 57 A.2d at 150, citing Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and Enforce-
ment 437 (2d ed. 1916), and 3 loore, Digest of International Arbitration to Which the
United States Has Been a Party 3221, 3223 (1S93).
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1902 treaty with Serbia 184 was questioned in Ivancevic v. Artukovic.18
The Ninth Circuit did not deal with the international law question of the
binding force of treaties on new or successor states, but only with the
factual controversy itself. The rule of law was assumed. Among other
evidence, the court was persuaded by the views of treatise writers80
that this was a case of enlargement of the territory of an existing state.
It noted, but did not agree with, the views of four European authorities 87
that Yugoslavia was a new state and not an enlargement, in the territorial
sense, of Serbia.
Occasionally, a court will go beyond the "intrinsic character" theory
on the question of whether a particular treaty has been abrogated by
war. Argento v. Horn18  declared that, while it was settled in the United
States that not all treaties were abrogated by war, it was not easy to
apply the "intrinsic character" theory to determine precisely what
treaties fell and what survived. Authorities, as well as the practice of
nations, presented a contrariety of views. The court referred to the
views of Calvo and Moore, adopted by the Supreme Court in 1929,180
184. Treaty With Servia for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, Oct. 25,
1901, 32 Stat. 1890, T.S. No. 406 (effective May 17, 1902).
185. 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818 (1954).
186. E.g., 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 375 (1943); 2 Hyde, Interna-
tional Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States 1535 (3d ed. 1945);
McNair, Law of Treaties 443 (1938), cited in 211 F.2d at 571, 572 n.19.
187. 211 F.2d at 572 n.19.
188. 241 F.2d 258 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 818 (1957). The case involved an
Italian who had lived for thirty years as a law-abiding resident of the United States. Italy
asked extradition on the basis of hearsay evidence which would be inadmissible in a munic-
ipal criminal case, but admissible in an Italian court. The court cited various publicists and
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464
(1823), and Clark v. Alien, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), for the view that not all treaties are
abrogated by war.
It is noteworthy that in none of the cases involving treaty suspension or abrogation did
the court attempt to ascertain foreign state practice. James J. Lenoir attempted to review
state practice on this question in his article, The Effect of War on Bilateral Treaties, with
Special Reference to Reciprocal Inheritance Treaty Provisions, 34 Geo. L.J. 129 (1946).
Lenoir stated that Britain has held from the eighteenth century to the present day that war
abrogates all treaties. The American Government held this theory, but not consistently, up
to World War I. He quotes a statement made by Austria and Russia in the 1890's that "the
doctrine that war annuls all pre-existing engagements between the adverse parties is a prin-
ciple of international law so universally proclaimed that we are surprised that it should
suddenly be denied with such vehemence." Lenoir, supra, at 145, citing a quote in Com-
ment on Article 35, Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (1935), 29 Am. J.
Int'l. L. Supp. 1184-85 (1935). Lenoir cited conflicting cases decided by French, Belgian,
German and Italian courts. The author's conclusion was that no clear rule of International
law existed, but that the general view was that war terminated pre-existing treaties, even
though the view had been abandoned on certain occasions and despite the recognition of
certain exceptions.
189. Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231, 236-37 (1929).
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that there was common agreement that at least the following types of
treaties remain in force: (1) stipulations as to what shall be done in
war, (2) treaties of cession, boundary, and the like, (3) provisions
giving rights to citizens to hold and transmit land in the territory of
the other party, and (4) provisions which represent completed acts.
On the other hand, treaties of amity and alliance designed to promote
harmony are generally regarded as annulled. The court felt that extradi-
tion, the subject of the treaty in question, did not conveniently fit into
either category, but held that the treaty was not abrogated. The court's
method in this case is clear. Whether all treaties were abrogated by
war was determined on the basis of American precedents, without
reference to a rule of international law. The types of treaties abrogated
were found by reference to publicists after a futile attempt to discover
a generally accepted rule of customary law.
E. Executive Department Statements and Legislation
Occasionally, statements by the executive branch of the United
States and foreign governments and legislation of Congress and foreign
states are used by judges in attempting to prove the existence of a
rule of customary law. In Lanbros Seaplane Base, Ine. v. The Batory,10
the Second Circuit cited an English statute 1 expressly overruling a
British court decision"o2 as part of its effort to show a rule of cus-
tomary law. The court also mentioned several American statutes"1 3 on
the subject of marine navigation and interpreted these statutes to
mean that Congress agreed with the rule. The dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Murphy in In re Yamashita'0 4 mentioned the laws of war recog-
nized by the executive branch in the Basic Field Manual Rules of Land
Warfare to show that the United States recognized criminal responsibility
for violation of the laws of war only as to those who commit the offenses
or order their commission. The same field manual was regarded by a
district court in Aboitiz & Co. v. Price":; as evidence of the attitude of
the United States towards Article 43 of the Hague Regulations in the
court's ruling that international law had established a body of rights
and duties incumbent on a belligerent occupant in the interests of order
and the welfare of the inhabitants of the occupied territory.
190. 215 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1954).
191. Air Navigation Act of 1936, 26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. S, c. 44.
192. Watson v. R. C. A. Victor Co., 50 Lloyd's List L-R. 77, 1935 Am. lar. Cas. 1251
(Sheriff's Ct. 1934).
193. E.g., 1 U.S.C. § 3 (195S); Act of Oct. 11, 1951, § 6(A)(c), 65 Stat. 403, 33 U.S.C.§ 144(c) (1958).
194. 327 U.S. 1, 37 (1946).
195. 99 F. Supp. 602, 610 (D. Utah 1951).
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A Department of State release and exchange of communications 9"
was cited in Murarka v. Bachrack Bros.'97 to show United States
agreement with the rule of law that each country has the right to
determine who are its nationals and that such a determination
will be accepted by other nations. In Ivancevic v. Artukovic,198 state-
ments by the executive branches of Yugoslavia and the United
States were important evidence that Yugoslavia had inherited the
treaty rights and obligations of Serbia. The court quoted a letter
from the Secretary of State, in answer to an American citizen in 192 1,199
expressing the opinion of the Department that the treaties were applica-
ble to the new government. While discounting the weight of this
opinion since it was given in the form of a private communication
in a nonadversary proceeding, the court noted, nevertheless, that the
communication was "an official one of the Secretary of State, as such,
with respect to a matter peculiarly within his charge.""0 Subsequent
letters of the Department2 .. confirmed that the treaties were in force.
The court also cited a proclamation of Prince Regent Alexander of
Yugoslavia in 1918202 showing that Serbia was the nucleus to which
the other nations adhered.
F. Diplomatic Communications
Communications from one government to another were considered
important evidence in Ivancevic v. Artukovic.203 The court referred
to a 1921 communication by the Yugoslav Charge d'Affaires to the
Secretary of State,204 stating that the government of the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes considered treaties between Serbia and the United States
applicable to the whole territory.
In United States v. Coplon °205 the district court quoted a 1933 letter of
196. 22 Dep't State Bull. 433-41 (1950).
197. 215 F.2d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1954).
198. 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818 (1954).
199. Letter from Secretary of State Hughes to De Frees, Buckingham and Eaton, Juno
4, 1921, Dep't of State file 711.60H/1, in 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 375
(1943).
200. 211 F.2d at 570-71.
201. Id. at 571 & n.15.
202. Christmas Day Proclamation from Prince Regent Alexander of Yugoslavia to His
People, Dec. 24, 1918, in [1919] 2 Foreign Rel. U.S. 896 (1934).
203. 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818 (1954).
204. Communication from Charg6 d'Affaires ad interim of the Kingdom of the Serbs,
Croats, and Slovenes to Secretary of State Hughes, Sept. 29, 1921, Dep't of State file
711.60H/3, in 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 375 (1943).
205. 88 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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the Under-Secretary of State to the Turkish Ambassador, ° not as
evidence, as in the Ivancevic case, but as an expression of the con-
trolling rule of customary law regarding diplomatic immunity. A diplo-
matic note was used in Hanafin v. McCarthy' 7 as evidence that Eire
succeeded to an 1899 treaty with Great Britain and Ireland relating to
disposition of real property.21°  The court cited a communication from
the British Foreign Office to the Secretary of State in 1924,2> 3 stating
that the creation of the Irish Free State was not regarded by the
British Government as affecting the applicability to Eire of the
convention of 1899.
G. Failure to Protest
Only two clear cases in which the courts cite the failure of a state
or states to protest have arisen in the postwar period. In one, the
failure to protest went to the evidence only; in the other, it went to a
customary law rule. In Hanafin v. McCarthy, 1 " the court thought it im-
portant that Eire had taken no action indicating repudiation of the treaty.
In Aboitiz & Co. v. Price,"11 the court declared: "Between 1918 and
1935, the validity and applicability of Articles 42-56 (of the Hague
Regulations) were confirmed in a great number of decisions of inter-
national and domestic tribunals; they were never contested by any
party to any dispute nor were they questioned by any government." 212
Evidently, the court's conclusion that a rule of customary law existed
was strengthened by the failure of states to protest against the Hague
Regulations.
H. Generally Accepted Principles
All the cases discussed to this point look to evidence of a consensus
of thought in order to find a binding rule of customary law. Several
cases, however, do not come under the holdings which have been ana-
lyzed. These also are based on binding rules of customary law arising
from common consent of nations, but the rules are found in the general
acceptance of the principles involved. This group differs markedly from
206. Letter from Under Secretary of State Phillips to Turllih Ambasador Mubtar, Oct.
16, 1933, Dep't of State file 701.09/374, in 4 Hackworth, op. cit. supra note 204, at 422
(1942).
207. 95 N.H. 36, 57 A.2d 14S (194S).
203. Convention With Great Britain and Ireland Respecting Tenure and DIepontion of
Real and Personal Property, March 2, 1S99, 31 Stat. 1939, T.S. No. 146.
209. See T.S. No. 146 at 3-4; see also [1924] 2 Fordgn Rel. U.S. 24S-49 (1939).
210. 95 N.H. 36, 39, 57 A2d 143, 150 (1943).
211. 99 F. Supp. 602 (D. Utah 1951).
212. Id. at 610, quoting Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of BcllHerCnt
Occupation 1, 13 at 5 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Monograph No. 6, 1942).
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the decisions which merely accept the rule of law on its face and apply it
to the factual controversy, without testing its authority in customary
law. Here the approach focuses on finding whether a rule of customary
law actually exists, with evidence of generally accepted principles used
as proof of the rule's existence.
Generally accepted principles were decisive of the issue of whether
the states or the federal government had rights over the land and minerals
underlying the Pacific Ocean from the low water mark to three miles
offshore in United States v. CaliJornia.13 The Supreme Court first
looked for the existence at the date of independence of an international
custom that nations owned the land underlying the three-mile belt. On
this point, the Court concluded that no charters, documents, or treaties
with England showed a purpose to set aside a belt for colonial or state
ownership. Since no custom was found, the Court decided the case on
the ground that since the eighteenth century the idea of a belt had been
accepted throughout the world. It therefore derived a rule of customary
law that a nation has certain rights in an offshore belt from the general
acceptance of the idea of a belt.
Generally accepted principles were decisive in settling whether the
Jones Act 14 applied to a Danish seaman who had signed on a Danish-
owned and registered ship in New York. 15 The Jones Act gave a right
of action to any seaman, either a citizen or a foreigner, to recover for
personal injuries suffered in the course of his employment. The Court
ruled initially that the statute only applied to areas in which United
States law would be considered operative under prevalent doctrines of
international law. To find the applicable international law, the Court
deferred to "an international maritime law of impressive maturity and
universality . . . [which] has the force of law, not from extraterritorial
reach of national laws ...but from acceptance by common consent of
civilized communities of rules designed to foster amicable and workable
commercial relations."2 6 In effect, the Court held that the customary
standard to be applied to the conflict of laws question was formed by
the principles previously accepted by "civilized communities."
I. History
Occasionally, the courts find it necessary to do historical research
in order to demonstrate that the decisive rule of customary law has
been derived from long-accepted principles. In Aboitiz & Co. v. Price,217
213. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
214. Merchant Marine Act § 33, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
215. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
216. 345 U.S. at 581-82.
217. 99 F. Supp. 602 (D. Utah 1951) ; see text accompanying notes 114-16 supra.
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the validity of Japanese currency was supported by a long history of the
use of such currency in nearly all wars as far back as the American
Revolution. The court even mentioned the issuance of leather money by
the Doge of Venice during the siege of Tyre in 112 2.218 In United
States v. California,219 the Supreme Court examined history to determine
whether an international custom existed at the time of American inde-
pendence regarding the ownership of the tidelands. Attempting to
prove that maintenance for life was a customary law rule derived from
generally accepted principles, the injured seaman in Farrell v. United
State 223 cited the laws of the Hanseatic Towns and early rules on
the liability of a shipowner to a sailor maimed in an attack by pirates.
The Court chose a contrary holding also based on agreed-upon principles.
A final example of the use of history is provided by Ivancevic v.
Artukovic 22' where the court did not deal with the international law
question of the relationship between state continuity and treaty rights
and obligations but only with the factual issue of whether Yugoslavia was
a new state. The court looked to certain historical evidence, including a
pronouncement of Serbia in 1914 favoring self-determination, a state-
ment by the Yugoslav Committee in London in 1915 for the unification
of the Yugoslavs into one state, and similar statements by the Com-
mittee of Yugoslavs on the Island of Corfu in 1917 and by the National
Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in 191S, and a proclamation by
the National Council of the unification of the various groups on Novem-
ber 24, 191 S. 22
It is easy to conclude from these cases that references to history to
support generally accepted principles do not seem particularly useful.
In several cases, such references appear to be little more than judicial
frivolity. Citations to history may prove valuable on a question of
fact, but no important question of customary law has been decided
primarily on the basis of historical proof of long-approved principles
in the period under consideration.
CONCLUSION
What are the reasons underlying judicial preference of one of the
three major approaches-noninternational law, common law and cus-
tomary law-in arriving at decisions? Certain conclusions present
218. Id. at 615.
219. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
220. 336 U.S. 511, 513-14 (1949); see text accompanying notes 123-34 supra.
221. 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 34S U.S. SIS (1954); scP text accompanying
notes 1&4-97 supra.
222. Id. at 56S-69.
1960]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
themselves. If the factual controversy presents an issue on which the
political branches of the government have already expressed an opinion,
the judiciary is reluctant even to consider the relevant questions of inter-
national law. This is particularly true where Congress or a state
legislature has passed legislation on the subject in question. Immunity
statutes are held conclusive of the immunity to be granted a foreign
diplomat, his family and employees, regardless of what immunity he
may possess under international law.
Where the court considers an issue a political one, involving the
successful prosecution of the foreign affairs of the country, a determina-
tion by the Executive or the Secretary of State forecloses further
judicial inquiry. The courts have ruled executive statements conclusive
not only of the status of a foreign diplomat, but of the immunity to be
accorded him as well. This contrasts sharply with the English and
French procedure, in which the executive determines status but the
courts determine the immunity under international law arising from
such status. The United States courts seem more prone to arguments
of policy and equity than perhaps they should be. Legal decisions on
the basis of rules of customary law are often avoided by reference to
policy requirements which the courts find no difficulty in rationalizing.
Finally, decisions based on rules of customary law are avoided where
the issue at bar is directly related to the internal affairs of the nation.
Thus, there are few references to international obligations in decisions
in potentially politically inflammatory areas such as racial discrimina-
tion. To date, the negative prohibition of state discrimination in the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution has served to partially fill
the gap between standards of morality recognized in the United Nations
Charter and actual practice within the nation. The "state action" doc-
trine of the fourteenth amendment has been tortured and twisted out of
all relation to its original meaning in judicial efforts to prevent attempts
to circumscribe the anti-discrimination provisions of the amendment.
However, the gap remains an open and festering wound which inevitably
will have to be treated by the courts or the electorate in the not too
distant future. 3
223. However remote, the conceptual possibility exists that the courts could find the
existence of a generally accepted rule of law requiring positive anti-discrimination by the
nations of the world. There is certainly sufficient evidence for such a customary rule In
the international treaties to which the United States is a party. The United Nations Charter
provisions on equal rights and fundamental freedoms may not be enforceable as treaty
obligations in American courts because they are not self-executing, see Fujii v. State, 38
Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952), discussed in note 44 supra, but they may be enforceable
as rules of customary law.
On a much smaller scale, decisions interpreting the Shipowner's Liability Convention
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Cases decided on the basis of controlling rules of customary law differ
markedly from the cases decided on noninternational law grounds. In
nearly all these cases, no statute has been passed on the issue in question;
no national policy conflicts with the customary rule; equitable considera-
tions may be present but are considered not decisive; no question is
presented that might embarrass the Executive in the conduct of foreign
relations, and no issue of importance to the internal affairs of the nation
is involved.
Consider, for example, three cases decided by the Court of Appeals
of the Second Circuit. In Bergman v. De Sicycs,"-  Judge Learned
Hand decided the question of a diplomat's immunity while in
transit on customary law grounds. The immunity statute did not cover
diplomats in transit, and no mention was made of any e.pression of
opinion by the State Department. In Bernstein v. Van H yglen Frcres
Societe Anonywe," 5 Judge Hand ignored the question of customary law,
basing his decision not to inquire into the acts of a foreign state within
its own borders on United States precedents. No justification was offered
for the controlling rule, but the precedents made clear that the so-
called "act of state" doctrine was followed to save the Executive possi-
ble embarrassment and to insure reciprocity on the part of foreign
courts. Having formulated the controlling rule, the majority next sought
but failed to find an executive policy indicating that the courts should
entertain actions of this particular nature. Judge Clark, dissenting, c dis-
agreed only with the finding that no executive policy existed. In State
follow this line of thought See, e.g., Farrell v. Unitcd States, 336 LTS. 511 (1949); Smith
v. United States, 167 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 194S), and Warrcn v. Unitcd State:, "40 LS, 523
(1951), discussed in text accompan-ying notes 127-133 supra. In the2s cascs, the eourts,
including the Supreme Court, held that the convention, plus previouly agr~ccd upon prin-
ciples, constituted a rule of customary law requiring statcs to enforce certain minimum
standards in the treatment of national and foreign scamLn by shipownerz. Although the
situations are distinguishable, there does not seem to be any adequate reason in lav why
states themselves may not be held to certain minimum standards in their treatment of
citizens. Such rules do e.dst for the treatment of aliens.
By means of the 1950 Rome Human Rights Convention, signatory statc: bound them-
selves to certain minimal rights for citizens. See text in 45 Am. J. Intl L. Supp. 24 (1951).
Individuals were given internationally enforceable rights even agaim-t their own rtatc:. A
Human Rights Commission and a European Court of Human Rights were fet up by the
convention to hear and decide claims. The court's first case, a suit by an Irish national
agamst Ireland charging illegal arrest for alleged membership in the Irish Republican Army,
began Oct. 3, 1960. N.Y. Times, OctL 4, 1960, p. 11, col. 1.
224. 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 194S) ; see text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
225. 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 33 U.S. 772 (1947); see notes CG-67 and
accompanying text.
226. Id. at 253.
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of the Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 227 Judge Clark applied
customary law in a dictum showing that an absent sovereign could validly
legislate for occupied territory. As in Bergman v. DeSieyes, the rule of
customary law was not opposed by a statute, a national policy, the con-
duct of foreign relations, or the internal affairs of the nation.
It may be concluded from the analysis in this article and the brief
survey of these three cases that most issues decided on the basis of cus-
tomary law in the United States courts are issues on which no other
grounds for the decision seem controlling. Essentially, the courts treat
customary international law as a subsidiary source of rules of law.
The next question that should be asked is: Do the state and federal
courts differ in their outlook toward customary international law? More
than seventy cases have been studied in this article. Of these, 'twenty-one
involved more or less detailed investigation of pertinent customary law
issues. Nineteen of these cases were decided by federal courts. The pro-
portion of cases decided in the federal and state courts based either on a
simple statement of an international law rule or on noncustomary law
rulings is twenty-seven to twenty-three. In order not to distort the results
of this tally, it should be noted that eight of the noninternational law deci-
sions decided in state courts involved only one problem-the question
of diplomatic immunities. Taking into account this repetition of cases
on one point, it is still obvious that on the simple level of numerical
comparison state courts are much more reluctant to venture into the
field of customary law than are the federal courts.
Keeping the use of rules of customary law in judicial decision-making
in proper perspective, what evidence of the existence of rules of law
appears most persuasive? The courts frequently refer to multilateral
conventions in determining that a general consensus of thought exists
among nations sufficient to form a binding rule of customary law.
There does not seem to be any real difference between conventions
which have been ratified by the United States and those to which the
United States is not a party. Nor does there seem to be a significant
distinction between conventions which have come into force and those
which have not received sufficient ratifications, several cases citing the
latter as grounds for a rule of law. The courts have not established any
rule requiring a specific number of accessions before a convention will
be considered binding on nonsignatories as an expression of the common
consent of civilized nations. In fact, in none of the postwar cases does
a court inquire into the actual number of ratifications or the composi-
tion of the ratifying nations.128
227. 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953).
228. For example, it might be worth considering the geographic acceptance of a con-
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Two related factors do seem to be of at least minor importance in
judicial analysis of international conventions. The more significant of
these is whether or not the court considers the convention merely declara-
tory of already existing general principles. The second is whether the
convention expressly states that its provisions are drawn up in accord
with accepted principles. In Bergman v. Dc Siees,2 - the Second
Circuit held a Latin American convention, which only several nations
had ratified, binding as an expression of a rule of customary law because
of a statement in the preamble that the convention was drawn up in
accordance with principles generally accepted by all nations. Where
a convention is considered declaratory of already existing principles,
the courts do not feel bound to interpret the convention strictly. On
the other hand, where the convention itself is the source of the customary
rule, the courts show a greater inclination to interpret the convention
literally.
From these conclusions, it is evident that no hard and fast rule on
the use of international conventions as evidence of a rule of customary
law can be safely suggested. International conventions offer a fertile
source of evidence in determining whether a rule of law exists. How-
ever, because there is no accepted definition of the requirements for
a customary rule, the courts are free to wallow in this quagmire of
evidence and to draw whatever conclusions they wish. It could be sug-
gested that the courts rarely find international conventions decisive
on the question of the existence of a rule. Rather, in most cases, con-
ventions appear to be convenient pegs on which to hang a sticky de-
cision.
Similarly, foreign court decisions and the writings of international
law publicists, although frequently cited, are rarely decisive of the
issue of law. Often it is impossible to tell whether the courts are truly
persuaded by foreign court decisions or publicists or whether they merely
select those writers or decisions which favor the point of view they
intend to adopt. In State of tze Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Banh,'
it seems probable that foreign court rulings were used as an argument
to bolster an already made decision. The district court, on the authority
of a Greek decision, held that the view prior to World War II was that
vention, great power acceptance, or acceptance by states whose interects are most con-
cerned in determining upon the so-called "general acceptance" of the principle es prezcd
in the particular convention. Presently, the only area of law where the composition of
ratifying states is of judicial concern is conventions involving maritime states.
229. 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1943) ; see text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
230. 99 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), rev'd, 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953); cse text
accompanying notes 159-63 supra.
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an absent sovereign could not validly legislate for occupied territory.
The court of appeals cited other foreign decisions for a contrary hold-
ing and concluded that the Greek case was a single aberration in world
practice. In Ivancevic v. Artukovic,23' the Ninth Circuit cited Ameri-
can and English publicists for its view and noted in passing that conti-
nental authorities take the opposite side of the question. The ultimate
in the use of foreign decisions as the basis of a rule of law appears in
American Transatlantic Co. v. United States, 32 where the Court of
Claims found a rule of international law on the basis of English decisions,
since no other grounds for disposing of the case seemed possible.
Next to international conventions, foreign court decisions and the
writings of international law authorities are most often cited as evidence
of the existence of a rule of customary law. It is worth noting that
the United States courts refer to English and continental practice almost
exclusively in the period under consideration. Only rarely do the courts
cite a non-European decision or publicist. As far as these two types of
evidence are concerned, then, the American courts apply international
law as interpreted by a small homogeneous group of nations. Undoubt-
edly, the courts should be encouraged to attempt a broader and more
inclusive analysis of both publications and foreign court practice in
determining upon the existence of a rule.
Diplomatic communications, statements by the executive branch, legis-
lation, failure to protest, and history are subsidiary means for proving
a rule of law and are infrequently employed. Occasionally, such proofs
are mere embellishments, as in A boitiz & Co. v. Price,33 where the court
thought it necessary to indicate that a Venetian Doge issued leather oc-
cupation money at the seige of Tyre in 1122. In contrast to such judi-
cial frivolity, these five means of proof occasionally add weight to an
opinion, although they never appear to be decisive of a controversy.
Analysis of diplomatic communications, executive statements and legis-
lation is confined to even a smaller group of nations than in the case
of judicial consideration of foreign court practice and the writings of
law authorities.
Finally, generally accepted principles seem particularly persuasive
to the courts as evidence of a rule of law. The step from generally
agreed-upon principles to a rule of customary law is an exceedingly
narrow one. The rule of law follows directly from the existence of ac-
cepted principles. Where no obvious common agreement exists from
231. 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818 (1954).
232. 113 Ct. C1. 484, 83 F. Supp. 832 (1949) ; see text accompanying notes 169-70 supra.
233. 99 F. Supp. 602, 615 (D. Utah. 1951).
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the available evidence, the court must initially attempt to construct
such a general agreement. Only then can it find the existence of a binding
rule of law. Since the basic problem confronting the courts is this inter-
mediate step of finding a general consensus sufficient to form a rule
of law, cases in which generally accepted principles are obvious do not
present particularly difficult questions.
Where no generally accepted principles appear evident at the begin-
ning of the court's analysis of an issue, it must plunge into a morass of
evidence in attempting to prove or disprove the existence of an agreed-
upon custom. The problem of too extensive evidence is further compli-
cated by the lack of an authoritative definition of the requirements for a
rule of customary law. Some standard is definitely desirable. Although a
rigidly inflexible standard would merely serve to handicap the courts
to a greater degree than they already are, since no standard could possi-
bly include the many diverse factors that make up a rule of law, some
attempt should be made by the judiciary to clarify the framework
within which the courts analyze issues of customary law.
It is easy to theorize about the great need for a world society based
on law to ameliorate and perhaps solve many of the conflicts in present-
day international relations. The step from theory to the realization of
a rule of law across national boundaries, however, is an extremely diffi-
cult one. The judicial systems of the nations of the world necessarily
must play a major part in developing an effective world legal system.
Courts must approach problems of international law constructively, by
clearly attempting to discover the common usage of nations. Customary
international law issues must be faced. International law rules should
not be employed solely as a last resort after other bases for decision
have proven inapplicable. Where the issue before the court is novel,
the court should attempt through its decision to develop an acceptable
rule of law.
Undoubtedly, different courts and different nations will continue to
disagree on just what the common usage of nations is on any particular
issue. Such disagreement is not only inevitable, but it is beneficial.
Disagreement on rules of customary law prevents the rules from becom-
ing brittle and insures that they will be flexible enough to satisfy the
ever-changing demands of modem international society.
The American judicial system has an important role to play in the
progression toward a world rule of law. By setting up a framework
within which to analyze issues of international practice, the courts
cannot help but be more successful in discovering just what the practice
of nations actually is on controversial points. Beyond the merits of
any actual case, however, a standard for analyzing evidence and finding
1960]
356 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
customary rules will hopefully add to the strength of the foundation on
which nations are attempting to develop an international society based
on law. Replacing the present random methods for discovering the
common usage of nations with a more standardized procedure will serve
notice to the world that henceforth American judicial decisions on ques-
tions of customary international law will clearly represent the estab-
lished practice of civilized nations.
